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NATIONAL BORDERING PROCESS 
 
In China's urban metropoles, the hukou system of household registration regulates 
one of the largest movements of people in human history. While rural-urban migrations 
are reshaping societies worldwide, the migrants who make up a great portion of urban 
China's low-wage labor force and burgeoning population face unique legal and social 
challenges. Although the trajectories of their migration do not cross international 
boundaries, most are legally prevented from ever gaining the within China's hukou 
system of household registration. The functions of this system parallel those of national 
citizenship policies, and are difficult to explain through standard conceptions of 
sovereignty and national citizenship. Extending recent work in border studies that thinks 
of borders in dimensions that go beyond the line itself, this thesis argues that national 
borders and national citizenship should not be considered as the exclusive sites from 
which bordering processes emanate. Instead, I argue that citizenship and bordering 
processes can both take place apart from the norms of nation-state territory. Based on a 
series of qualitative interviews conducted in Shanghai and Anhui province, this article 
examines the structure and effects of the hukou system as it regulates legal inclusion and 
exclusion of migrant workers.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In contemporary Shanghai, the evidence of internal migration is woven through 
the fabric of the city itself. Its impact on the city’s role as the greatest economic and 
financial center in modern China is undeniable. When I asked a group of financial 
professionals about the role migrants have played in the city’s development, the response 
was simple. Gesturing out the window of the 40th floor conference room toward the 
glittering skyline of central Shanghai, a young actuary gave a simple but powerful 
answer: “Without them, buildings like this could not be built.” The internal migrants 
whose labor plays an integral part not only in construction but also in Shanghai’s 
burgeoning service industry, however, are set apart from their counterparts elsewhere 
around the world. Through a legal system known as the hukou, internal migrants across 
China are explicitly excluded from full membership in the urban polity.  Instead, they 
remain as temporary residents, a legal status that not only denies them many of the state 
benefits that accrue to full residents of China’s largest cities, but also solidifying the 
social exclusion faced by migrants in a codified legal framework. Functioning as a 
citizenship policy that is enforced at the local level, the hukou system controls access to 
healthcare, education, some kinds of housing, and employment in state-owned 
enterprises. 
The image of the migrant has figured heavily among the tropes of globalization. 
As the common narrative goes, changing economies and warming climates have 
increasingly become the drivers for migration patterns that bring hundreds of millions of 
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people worldwide into motion – some looking for a better life, others in search of 
adventure or a temporary boost in income, and still others driven from their homes by 
war or other catastrophe. On the other end of the spectrum of wealth, some people move 
to reunify families, manage multinational corporations, or to seek tax havens. The vast 
majority of migrants worldwide, however, originate in communities that are 
comparatively poor, rural, and otherwise peripheral – at least in relation to their 
destinations. 
Like all presumptively global phenomena, the phenomenon of migration is cut 
across with contradictions and incongruences. To make sense of one aspect of human 
mobility inevitably requires one to ignore, downplay, or potentially even misrepresent 
aspects that would cause an otherwise coherent understanding to unravel. It should not 
come as a surprise, then, that any hard and fast typology is untenable. In fact, the broader 
phenomenon of migration is rarely considered as a whole, and is commonly divided into 
more theoretically manageable elements. While these categorizations vary widely in 
methodology and function, one of the most basic divisions in migration studies is 
theoretical boundary between internal migration – occurring within the territory of one 
nation-state – and international migration, which crosses international borders. 
This distinction carries such power that its effects have been enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaims that individuals have unqualified freedom
of movement and residence within the borders of each state (United Nations 1948). 
Beyond normative frameworks, the divide between internal and international 
migration is readily visible in scholarship. A broad literature has emerged that deals 
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explicitly with questions of international migration, including questions of 
transnationalism, citizenship, and bordering (Johnson et al. 2011; Bloemraad, Korteweg, 
and Yurdakul 2008). Perspectives on international migration range from theoretical to 
practical, critical to conservative, and often invokes debates over ethical and legal norms 
(Bauder 2003; Millner 2011). Internal migration, however, has attracted a very different 
tradition of scholarship. Much of the theoretical attention that has been directed at 
internal migration relates to development and economic transitions, demography, and the 
effects of internal migration on migrant-receiving cities (Skeldon 2014; Ackah and 
Medvedev 2012). While the plight of migrants is a common topic in both internal and 
international contexts (M. Davis 2006; De Genova and Peutz 2010), the tone of 
discussion is tempered by normative differences between the largely unquestionable 
legitimacy of internal migrants and the various shades of legal acceptance and rejection 
that are so central to the process of international migration. When viewing state controls 
over international migration through the normative framework of citizenship and 
sovereign control of territory, the justifications for tight controls over international 
migration and a comparative paucity of regulation over internal migration are easy to see 
(Bosniak 2008).  
Despite its utility and near-universal acceptance, this divide between internal and 
international migration is not fundamental. The regulation of the movements of citizens 
within national boundaries has important theoretical repercussions, and reflects 
meaningfully on the narratives that nation-states employ to justify their (often harsh) 
policies regulating international migration. In order to bring these insights to bear on the 
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current tight relationship between citizenship, sovereignty, and migration control, I have 
chosen to analyze the case of the hukou household registration system that governs 
internal migration within China. While China does present a unique case – the hukou can 
to some extent be seen as a relic resulting from China's postsocialist history – it is also far
from a fringe case, as China's current internal migration – which by some estimates 
represents the mobilization of over 260 million people - represents what is arguably the 
largest population transfer in human history. Based on the insights I have gained through 
five months of qualitative fieldwork in Shanghai, China, I argue in this thesis that 
comparative analysis of the structure and function of china's hukou system of household 
registration requires a re-theorization of one of the most fundamental analytical divisions 
in migration studies. Theoretically, this thesis should be read as an attempt to add 
complexity to current analyses of state efforts to regulate, manage, or control human 
mobility. Empirically, it should be viewed as a bridge, drawing the threads of preliminary 
connection between the experiences of migrants whose journeys have brought them into 
unfamiliar and often hostile territories – whether their journeys crossed international 
boundaries or not. 
This chapter introduces the setting, subject, and methodology of this study. First, I
outline the historical trajectory of the hukou system, which continues to be reshaped to fit
the needs of the state. I move then to address the more recent history of internal migration
in China, focusing especially on the rise of the so-called “floating population” – the 
increasingly large social class living outside of their place of hukou registration, and as 
such existing “out of place” in the eyes of the state. Following my discussion of China’s 
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floating population as a whole, I focus on Shanghai, the site of my empirical research, 
and point out its unique place in modern Chinese history, as well as the impact that 
successive waves of migration have had in bringing it to its current prominence as 
China’s most economically powerful urban area. I then discuss of the methodology and 
scope of my five months of research in Shanghai, clarifying the goals and approach I took
to research, as well as issues of site selection, recruitment of informants, and the role of 
research assistants in facilitating my work. Finally, I close with an outline of the purpose 
and goals of this thesis as a whole, as well as its place in a continuing research agenda 
that hopes to shed critical light on the tools states use to regulate human mobility across 
wildly different contexts. 
Hukou and mangliu: Histories of Chinese migration and control
To effectively capture an understanding of the history and contemporary reach of the 
hukou system as a whole would vastly exceed the possible scope of this thesis. After 
having passed through a complex history in which its purpose and scope have changed 
profoundly, the current hukou system can perhaps be best understood as a citizenship 
policy contained within the broader rubric of China's national citizenship policy. While 
China is formally constituted as a unitary (as opposed to federal) nation-state, the hukou 
system effectively divides membership in the nation-state through the registration of 
individuals and households as official legal residents of villages, towns, and specific 
districts in urban areas. As such, the hukou creates another layer to the conception of 
what citizenship really means in China (Guo 2014). Under the current legal structure, 
hukou registration is administered in a decentralized manner, with the practical matters of
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implementation left to local governments under the guidance of the central government 
(Zhao and Zhang 1999). While this decentralization does not mean that the hukou exists 
outside the realm of party-state government, it has led to a proliferation of hukou 
implementations by local governments at the urban, village, and town level (Chan and 
Buckingham 2008). 
While China's national government is concerned by the plight of millions of rural 
workers without permanent status in urban areas, and has begun to promote policies that 
will facilitate easier hukou transfer between rural areas and from rural areas to small and 
medium-sized cities, the decentralization of hukou administration has in fact led large, 
first-tier cities to implement even more restrictive policies under which permanent hukou 
transfer is even more difficult than before. In effect, the decentralization of hukou policy 
has led to a gradation of accessibility in which large, wealthy urban areas are almost 
completely closed to official hukou transfer (while simultaneously issuing millions of 
temporary residence permits) and smaller villages and towns (which often have relatively
little to offer in terms of government services or economic prospects) are completely 
open to new residents. This creates a de-facto system of political closure and urban 
citizenship, in which nearly half of the residents of China's largest and most prosperous 
cities are unable to access state resources and are permanently and legally excluded from 
political membership, as well as much of social life. 
The hukou system has not always functioned in this way. In this section, I provide
a brief outline of the history of the hukou system, which I hope will aid in understanding 
the structure of the current system.  The hukou, as well as the mass migration that it 
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attempts to regulate, have their roots in the development of early socialist policy, enacted 
in the years immediately following the 1949 communist revolution. While the system's 
conceptual underpinnings may be linked historically to the baojia system for registering 
households in premodern China, the history of which stretches back as far back as 685 
BC (Zhu 2003; Fan 2008), the hukou system was first and foremost developed as a 
central tool for social control in the early Communist period. In many ways, the hukou 
system is directly connected to the Soviet propiska, or internal passport system. The 
propiska regulated internal migration in the Soviet Union primarily through access to 
housing, combining the functions of an ID card with something that was very much like 
an “internal visa” (Pipko and Pucciarelli 1985, 916). Justified as providing a functional, 
modern, and manageable alternative to the chaos of capitalist migration, the propiska 
system was intended to provide an efficient distribution of labor, and was defended as a 
necessary aspect of the Soviet system until well into the 1980s (Buckley 1995). However,
the rise in the hukou system's importance did not occur through the wholesale adoption of
the Soviet system, but rather through the specific history of economic and political 
challenges to the People’s Republic after its formation. 
 The earliest communist policies in fact enshrined a right to free internal migration
and freedom of residence in both the 1949 Common Program and 1954 constitution. 
Rather than representing an anomaly, this policy was in fact a continuation of the de-facto
lack of regulation over movement under past administrations, from the Qing dynasty to 
the Guomindang republic to Japanese rule. At the same time, however, the new 
government began the resettlement of tens of thousands of unemployed residents of 
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Beijing, Shanghai, and other large cities. Shanghai in particular was targeted, as only 
about half of its six million residents were estimated to be contributing to what the state 
considered (according to a rather narrow definition) productive labor. As a result, 
thousands of people were encouraged to relocate inland, although these relocations were 
for the most part voluntary (Cheng and Selden 1994).
In its first instance, implemented through a set of “Regulations Governing Urban 
Population (Ibid 1994, 649)” the hukou system served only as a registration system – a 
function that it still fulfills, but which it has long since surpassed. Like similar systems in 
other contexts, the hukou required the registration of residences according to set 
categories, but did not offer any real restrictions on the freedom of residence or 
movement. By 1952, however, the state turned to the system not only as a tool for 
registration, but also as a means to check increasing peasant migration into urban areas. 
This migration was referred to in official policy and common parlance alike as mangliu, 
or “blind flow.” In this understanding, officials worried that poorly-informed peasants 
would flood urban areas without any definite prospects, overwhelming fledgling socialist 
systems and draining the countryside of productive labor necessary for the continued 
maintenance of the urban laboring population (Fan 2008, 43-44). Mangliu is also 
significant as a reverse homophone for liumang, or hooligan (Cheng and Selden 1994, 
654). Through their identification with mangliu, migrants were painted not only as 
moving irrationally, but also as potentially disruptive. Despite official preoccupations, 
migration continued apace, without substantial limitations on rural to urban mobility. This
migration accounted for an increase in China’s urban population by nearly 20 million 
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between 1949 and 1956, with most migrants attracted by urban employment, which was 
preferable over farm labor in terms of security, prestige, and benefits. 
Throughout the 1950s, there was a progressive tightening of the hukou system, 
transforming it from a simple registration system into the primary means of control under
a command economy. Housing, food, and even temporary lodging in hotels and 
guesthouses were all controlled according to the various gradations in hukou status 
(Cheng and Selden 1994). A simplified version of the system implemented in 1956 
succeeded in virtually eliminating migration to urban areas. Distribution of food was 
dependent on hukou status, such that urban residents and state employees were eligible 
for grain rations, while all persons falling under the “rural” classification (nongye hu) 
were rendered ineligible, under the assumption that rural farm families produced grain 
primarily for subsistence, and had no need for food distributed by the state. With 
foodstuffs largely unavailable in urban areas outside of state-provided rations, it became 
difficult or nearly impossible for migrants to survive in urban areas without the blessing 
of the state, granted when state enterprises needed access to rural labor. Even in these 
cases, recruited labor migrants were discouraged from bringing their dependents (as so-
called nonproductive surplus population) to the cities with them (Cheng and Selden 
1994).
A redesigned hukou system was implemented in 1958, with new provisions for 
official labor recruitment, migration permits, and processes for changing one’s hukou 
status. Under the system as reformed in 1958, hukou statuses are divided not only 
according to the sole registered place of residence of each individual, but also between 
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agricultural (nongye) and non-agricultural (fei nongye) hukou statuses  (Chan and Zhang 
1999; Fan 2008). At the same time, the bureaucratic chaos of the Great Leap Forward and
devolution of formerly centralized state authority to local governments made any 
attempts to implement the new regulations nearly impossible. Apart from bureaucratic 
difficulties themselves, the unprecedented industrialization of the Great Leap Forward 
brought with it unprecedented migration to urban areas, driven by the combination of 
labor recruitment for urban industry and rural famine.  After the re-imposition of the 
system in 1960, it has retained much of the structure that was laid out in 1958 (Chan and 
Zhang 1999).
China’s contemporary floating population
Although its early history was complex, the function of the hukou system has remained 
relatively stable since it was restructured in 1958, and – unlike its Soviet counterpart, 
which had a relatively small effect on migration in a structural sense (Buckley 1995) – 
was largely successful in limiting the size of China’s internal migrant population, at least 
until marketization reforms made it possible for agricultural hukou holders to obtain food
in China’s cities. These reforms, beginning in the late 1970s, permitted the purchase of 
food in urban areas on the open market, and also made it possible for rural migrants to 
find employment outside of state-owned firms, where local hukou status is a precondition
for hiring. 
Perhaps the most emblematic term associated with the vast population transfer 
that began with China’s marketization reforms is the idea of the “floating population” or 
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liudong renkou, which became the primary identifier for migrants in the 1980s (Chan and
Zhang 1999). While the earlier concept of mangliu emphasized the supposed irrational, 
blind nature of migration to the cities, the increased use of the term liudong renkou in the 
1980s is based on different priorities. In fact, categorization itself depends on the hukou 
system for meaning. In the eyes of the state, individuals’ place belonging is reflected 
solely through their place of hukou registration – as a result, any movement without a 
corresponding change in registration is anomalous and undirected. The floating 
population, then, is made up of individuals who have come unmoored from firm – that is,
legal – ties to their official place of residence. 
Since the late 1970s, internal migration and the floating population have been key 
areas of concern for the Chinese state. The sheer scale of the phenomenon is an important
reason in itself. From 1982, when census data estimated that approximately 11.2 million 
people were permanently living outside their place of registration, the size of the floating 
population has skyrocketed (H. X. Wu 1994). Because of the transient and often-irregular
character of internal migration in China, the size of the floating population is notoriously 
difficult to estimate with any degree of certainty. By the mid-1990s, official government 
estimates placed the size of the floating population at around 80 million. 44 million 
migrants had registered for temporary residence certificates – a system that had only been
implemented in 1985. According to survey data, however, nearly 80% of migrants had 
failed to register for temporary residence certificates (Chan and Zhang 1999). Given the 
large number of migrants, the legal circumvention necessary to migrate, and the pressure 
placed on census takers and local administrators to report favorable population figures, it 
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is easy to see the difficulties inherent in estimating the size of the migrant population 
across China.
 These circumstances have scarcely improved, as Cindy Fan notes in her in-depth 
analysis of more recent migration statistics and governmental estimates (Fan 2008). After
sorting through ambiguous data and discarding obviously specious population claims, 
Fan arrives at an estimate for the size of the floating population in 2000 at nearly 200 
million people. However, this estimate of the floating population references all 
individuals who have stayed outside their place of registration for more than six months, 
regardless of rationale or reason. Considering a smaller subset of the population, the 2013
National Peasant Worker Monitoring Survey reports that as of 2013, of the 268 million 
nongmingong, or peasant workers (that is, individuals with agricultural hukou status 
engaged in non-agricultural wage labor), 166 million were counted as waichu 
nongmingong – peasants who had gone out to work (China Statistical Bureau 2014). This
distinction is important – popular media and scholarship alike has seized on the “floating 
population” label to signify the migration of poor rural workers to urban areas, but many 
statistical analyses extend far beyond counts of labor migrants, statistically capturing a 
variety of other populations. While the bulk of medium and long-term internal movement
in China does consist of labor migration, and is primarily represented by rural workers 
who “go out” to work in urban centers, statistical counts of the “floating population” 
based on raw hukou data also includes students who move to enroll in university, spouses 
who move for marriage purposes but are unable to obtain a local hukou, and others. Even 
when considering only labor migrants, however, the scale of China’s current internal 
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migration is incomparable, existing on the same order of magnitude as worldwide 
international migration. For reference, UN estimates of the global population of migrants 
living outside their country of citizenship (which, naturally, are also subject to a wide 
margin of error) put that number at 178 million in 2000, and 214 million in 2010 
(Henning and Hovy 2011). 
Shanghai: History of a migrant metropolis
The size and widely varied nature of China’s floating population makes any kind of 
coherent unifying analysis difficult. Scholarly attempts to understand the phenomenon as 
a whole generally lean heavily on statistics (e.g. Fan 2008) or analyses of specific legal 
particularities (e.g. Chan and Zhang 1999; Zhang and Tao 2012), while popular accounts 
follow along with the trials and joys of individual migrant lives in order to write vignettes
condensing the sweeping changes brought by migration and rapid urbanization into 
archetypes representing the phenomenon as a whole (e.g. Chang 2008; Loyalka 2012). 
Other work simply does not attempt to understand or theorize the experiences of the 
floating population as a coherent whole. Anthropologists in particular have brought 
ethnographic methodologies to bear on the local specificities of migrant experiences, 
offering theoretically complex accounts of small slices of migrant experience (P. Ngai 
2005; Zhang 2001). 
The experiences of factory workers in the factory cities of the Pearl River Delta – 
Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Dongguan – are perhaps the most commonly invoked example of 
Chinese internal migration in popular media. Besides Leslie Chang’s Factory Girls 
(2008), which may be one of the most popular books on the floating population, the 2012 
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storm of media attention following investigations into suicides by workers in electronics 
factories that manufacture Apple products brought unprecedented Western attention to the
stories of migrant workers in China, from CNN specials (Weir 2012) to Wall Street 
Journal reports (Mozur 2015). This focus makes sense, as Guangdong province is the 
single largest destination for internal migrants within China (Fan 2008). Shenzhen, the 
largest manufacturing hub in southern China, had locally registered population of about 1
million people in 2005, but a total resident population of about 8 million, putting the 
migrant share of the population over 85% (Chan 2010; Chan 2009). For visibility in the 
West, of course, it doesn’t hurt that the region centralizes production of vast quantities of 
goods for popular consumption in Western markets.
Shanghai, however, is not seen as a production hub or migrant city, but as China’s 
financial center. The Pudong New District development project, and particularly the 
Lujiazui financial district that began construction in the 1990s, is immediately 
recognizable from a Western vantage point as an iconic symbol of futuristic Asian 
development.1 While Shenzhen rose to prominence after the establishment of the special 
economic zone there in 1980, Shanghai has also been a migrant city. After the end of the 
Opium War in 1842, Shanghai was forcibly opened to Western trade as a treaty port, and 
quickly became a trade, manufacturing, and financial center. Fifty years later, its 
population had surpassed one million, and between 1900 and 1950 the population had 
1 The 2013 Oscar-winning science fiction film Her, a portrayal of love in the time of artificial 
intelligence, was filmed in Shanghai. The atmosphere of the film’s portrayal of a bright, clean,
technology driven and yet profoundly melancholic future was largely established through 
aerial establishing shots looking down canyonlike avenues between skyscrapers in Lujiazui. 
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grown by an additional three million. Much of this growth was due to migration: A 
survey conducted in 1946 showed that four-fifths of the city’s population originated 
elsewhere in China (Feng, Zuo, and Ruan 2002). At the time of the 1949 revolution, 
Shanghai was China’s most prominent industrial city, and continued to draw significant 
in-migration in the years following 1949. Some of the earliest developments in the hukou 
system were targeted directly at Shanghai, which had experienced high rates of in-
migration throughout the early 1950s. In 1951 alone, when the city’s total population was
still below five million, in-migration estimates reached 930,000 – a population growth of 
nearly 20%. Many of these early migrants were later expelled to the countryside as the 
state attempted to enact controls over migration and solidify Shanghai’s position as an 
economic center under the firm control of the state – reported outmigration rates in 1978 
reached 461,000, much of which was encouraged by the state, if not facilitated through 
outright coercion (Gui and Liu 1992; Cheng and Selden 1994). 
Through the 1960s and most of the 1970s, internal migration to Shanghai was 
significantly reduced, primarily through the combination of the hukou system with the 
restriction of food rations. Between 1960 and 1977, in-migration to the city hovered 
below 100,000 annually, while out-migration (much of it coerced either through the 
hukou system or through the “sending down” process of the cultural revolution) 
fluctuated, but remained largely above 100,000 annually. This negative net population 
transfer actually resulted in Shanghai’s 1977 population being lower – at 5.4 million – 
than it had been prior to the crackdown on migration twenty years earlier, when it had 
surpassed 6 million (Gui and Liu 1992). At the time, migrants made up less than 5% of 
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Shanghai’s resident population. By 1993, however, the migrant population had expanded 
significantly as a result of increased migration rates through the 1980s, and internal 
migrants made up over 20% of the population, or nearly 3 million people. Most recently, 
the 2010 census reports that Shanghai’s population had reached 23 million by the end of 
the year, and that the resident floating population present in the city for more than six 
months had reached 8.97 million, or 38 percent of the total resident population. In 
addition to the almost nine million long-term resident migrants living in Shanghai, the 
census tabulated an additional 2.24 million “short term” members of the floating 
population, who had been in the city for less than six months (Shanghai Statistical Bureau
2011).  
Researching the hukou system in Shanghai
The initial idea for  this thesis originated during my final year as an undergraduate 
student, when I carried out a small research project on Chinese internal migration as part 
of an advanced Chinese language course. At the time, my research was focused squarely 
on political conflicts over migration and border control along the U.S. – Mexico border, 
and I was struck by the similarities between the circumstances of Chinese migrants and 
undocumented migrants in the United States. As I saw it, both cases were extreme – if 
very different – examples of what happens when human mobility runs up against legal 
barriers intended to manage and regulate populations. After completing my project on the
US-Mexico border, I began to question the broader frameworks that allow these legal 
barriers to function. Much of the literature on citizenship and bordering that I had read 
based the legal viability of such processes on the sovereign right of the nation-state to 
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regulate its borders and to exclude foreigners. In China, however, such a system exists 
within the boundaries of a single state, separated from any potential justification by the 
supposed right of nations to exclude foreigners. The situation in China, it seemed to me, 
was yet another example of how state power can be leveraged against migrants as part of 
a system of exclusion and dominance that solidifies gaps in wealth and status through 
official legal categorizations. If, as some scholars have argued, the system of international
borders itself represents a system of “global apartheid,” (Nevins 2010; Sharma 2005) 
what are the implications of a system that performs similar work within one nation’s 
borders?
I chose Shanghai as the site of my research for two reasons. Li Zhang, the 
professor at Fudan University who I first made contact with as I was applying for the 
National Science Foundation EAPSI fellowship that funded my research encouraged me 
to come to Shanghai, and was exceptionally supportive of my work while I was there. 
The help I received from Professor Zhang and his students Tao Li, Yuan Jing, and Miao 
Jiaju was invaluable, and I doubt that this project would have reached this state without 
their assistance. In addition to the connections I was able to make, Shanghai is a 
theoretically and empirically ideal location for my fieldwork. As outlined above, while 
Shanghai may be outshone by the Pearl River Delta as a statistical and narrative 
archetype for Chinese internal migration under the hukou system, the city has a long 
history as a hub for migration, and in fact most of its residents have family histories in the
city that date back one generation or less. As China’s most “developed” city, Shanghai 
also highlights the social gulf that separates migrant workers from relatively privileged 
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locals. Finally, Shanghai has an outsize impact on urban policy throughout China, and has
come to the forefront as an innovator in reconfiguring local implementations of hukou 
reform and migration management (Zhang and Tao 2012). 
Intended to provide a grounded framework for deeper understanding of the hukou 
system and to draw out useful information about how migrant and non-migrant residents 
of Shanghai understand both migration and the hukou system itself, the questions I posed 
to frame my research were as follows: 
1. How is the hukou system in china operationalized in Shanghai? What 
mechanisms (judicial, disciplinary, economic, structural, affective) create 
and enforce difference for rural migrants to the city?
1a. How do migrants experience hukou status in their everyday lives?
1b. What are the paths through which hukou is implemented? What 
official or unofficial personnel, if any, are tasked with implementing 
and maintaining the system at “street level”?
While the hukou system itself exists as a series of legal inscriptions and policy 
decisions, it is also lived out in real life, in the everyday lived experiences of migrants 
and in the opportunities or lack thereof that they encounter as migrant subjects in 
Shanghai. Byexamining  how legal norms are operationalized in practice, it is possible to 
gain an understanding of the hukou system that goes beyond a close reading of hukou 
policy documents. 
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2. How is the hukou system rendered justifiable? Do justifications of the 
system refer to productive work done by internal bordering?
2a. How do migrants in Shanghai and Shanghai hukou holders view 
the effects of migration on the city?
2b. How do hukou implementers understand their roles in the internal
migration system?
2c. How are migrants understood as “other” through media and legal 
discourse surrounding the hukou system?
The migration management policies enacted on and across international borders are 
largely naturalized through notions of citizenship and sovereignty. Within China, 
however, such narratives have no purchase, as migrants do not cross recognized 
international borders. How, then, do the subjects of China’s migration management 
regime understand its (il)legitimacy? Taking a slightly different tack, scholarly work on 
bordering processes has asked the question of who benefits and how from the imposition 
of borders (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Harrison and Lloyd 2012). Given that much of 
China’s export production and rapid urbanization rests on the labor of migrant workers, I 
was curious to see how migrants and locals alike viewed migrant contributions to the city.
While research question 2b reflects my initial hope to conduct interviews with officials 
inside and outside the state who have a direct or indirect role in the implementation of the
hukou system, I was largely unable to secure this level of access. In particular, recorded 
interviews with state officials were impossible to obtain as a foreign researcher without 
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any official connection to a university work unit, and the outstanding assistance I 
received from graduate students at Fudan university simply did not carry enough weight. 
In order to answer the questions outlined above, I conducted a series of 12 
interviews and  one formal and one informal focus group over the course of five months 
spent in China, altogether speaking on the record with 26 individuals. Basic information 
about these interviews is collected in Table 1. The majority (10) of my interviews were 
conducted in Shanghai, while six were conducted during a trip to Anhui province, in a 
rural community that is home to many migrants who have worked in Shanghai and 
elsewhere. In selecting interview subjects, my intention was to capture a broad slice of 
opinion and experience. As such, my interview subjects span a broad variety of 
occupations, roles, and backgrounds, from a long-term migrant who first came to 
Shanghai when grain markets opened in the late 1970s, to a retired administrator with 
decades of experience in Shanghai’s population statistics bureau, to a group of young 
Shanghainese financial professionals, to the migrant owners of street restaurants. While 
the specific questions I used to structure my open-ended interviews varied between 
interviewees, most interviews followed a similar structure, beginning with questions 
about the interviewee’s employment, history of migration or family history in Shanghai. 
These questions then built into queries about perceptions of the hukou system, migrants 
and migration itself, and (for migrants) experiences of discrimination. 
In addition to the interviews I conducted, my understanding of the hukou system 
and the function of migration management in China is also supported by my experience 
as an observer living in Shanghai over the course of five months. While the hukou system
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itself is not necessarily a common conversation topic for most of the people I ran across 
in my day-to-day life, migration is a very visible phenomenon in Shanghai's public and 
economic life. In contrast to many of the stories of migrants in Pearl River Delta factory 
cities, where many migrants’ lives revolve around life in employer-run dormitories (P. 
Ngai 2005; Chang 2008), many Shanghai migrants work in the service industry. 
Anecdotally, in the five months I spent in Shanghai, most of the low-wage service 
industry workers I interacted with were migrants. As a white foreigner, many of the 
people I interacted with often asked me what I was doing in Shanghai. The vast majority 
of the individuals I spoke with regularly – shopkeepers, restaurant workers, and other 
service industry employees – were migrants, and when I replied that I was a graduate 
student studying migration, the conversation would often turn to that person's hometown, 
or their own migrant experience. While these interactions were often fleeting and difficult
to quantify, they gave me an additional window into the texture of everyday migrant life 
in Shanghai. 
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Table 1: Interviews and Focus Groups
Pseudonym Location Information
Xiaohua Shanghai (Yangpu District) Middle-aged Anhui migrant woman employed 
as a maid/janitor. About 5 years in Shanghai.
Lao Jin Shanghai (Yangpu District) Elderly Anhui man employed as a water 
deliveryman. Over 20 years in Shanghai. 
Ren Zhusun,
Wang Xiaoyan
Shanghai (Yangpu District) Elderly Sichuan couple operating an informal 
rice/noodle stand. Over 10 years living in 
Shanghai.
Zhang Menggan Shanghai (Yangpu District) Middle-aged Sichuan restaurant owner (formal 
economy). 7 years living in Shanghai.
Tan Baibao Shanghai (Pudong New District) Middle-aged Shandong housewife. Moved to 
Shanghai for husband's middle-class job 
prospects 12 years ago. 
Ping Chenguang, 
Zhu Baiyue
Shanghai (Yangpu District) Middle-aged Shanghai women – both are retired
members of the Shanghai population statistics 
department.
Guo Tai Shanghai (Yangpu District) Young male Shanghainese Demographic 
Studies professor at Fudan University
Wu Li Li Anhui Province (Taoyangcun) Young migrant woman, currently working as a 
nanny in Shanghai. 
Zhang Bangrong Anhui Province (Taoyangcun) Middle-aged Anhui man, working as a 
shopkeeper. Several family members currently 
performing migrant labor..
Feng Longshi Anhui Province (Taoyangcun) Middle-aged Anhui migrant, working in 
Shandong province as a truck driver for about 8 
years. 
Liu Nukuang Anhui Province (Taoyangcun) Young Anhui shopkeeper. Her husband has 
worked as an itinerant construction worker for 3
years.
Yuan Zhinu Anhui Province (Wuhu city) Elderly middle-class Anhui woman. Several 
family members work and attend school in 
Shanghai.
Focus Group 1 Shanghai (Huangpu District) Six young Shanghai natives working as 
actuaries in a foreign-owned finance 
corporation. All had attended universities in 
either the U.S. or U.K.
Focus Group 2 Anhui (Taoyangcun) Informal focus group conversation with six 
Anhui natives of varying ages on the main 
commercial street of Taoyangcun village. All 
had either performed migrant labor themselves 
or had close friends and family who had. 
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Thesis outline
Through the research design outlined above, my intent was to provide a theoretical and 
empirical bridge between studies of internal migration and international migration. Such 
work would not only question some of the underpinnings of citizenship theories, but 
would also allow scholars to draw a greater diversity of useful connections between the 
experiences of social and legal exclusion faced by labor migrants who cross boundaries 
that exist at scales other than the traditional nation-state border. This work is not only a 
continuation of current trends in border studies, which have begun to move outward away
from the border itself to consider the fields and processes that regulate migration far from
lines themselves (Johnson et al. 2011), but also an empirical response to the numerous 
scholars writing on dilemmas of citizenship and bordering who have made gestures 
toward similarities between the experiences of Chinese migrants and their own research 
agendas, but have not yet fully drawn the connections between Chinese migration, the 
hukou system, and current developments in border studies (McNevin 2013; Ong 2006; 
Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008).
In the following chapters, I will trace a framework for understanding the 
connections and discontinuities between international systems of migration management. 
In Chapter 2, I review existing literature on both borders and citizenship, outlining the 
theoretical reasoning that justifies an understanding of China's hukou system as a 
bordering process understood alongside other similar processes in the international 
context. I also point out the inroads that have been made by existing literature, 
particularly scholarship on the hukou system that positions it as an urban citizenship 
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policy and work in border studies that has mentioned (albeit briefly) the possibility of 
drawing a comparison between internal migrants in China and international migrants 
elsewhere. In drawing conclusions from this literature, I also address a primary question 
that faces this scholarly project: How are we to understand the bordering of Chinese cities
without a clearly visible physical border? 
In Chapter 3, I consider the legal bordering facilitated by the hukou system in 
detail, drawing specific comparisons between the structures that divide China's urban and
rural, areas and the ways that the boundaries of citizenship are drawn in the international 
context. Rather than attempting to address all of the myriad specificities of the hukou 
system and of international border policy, I draw out specific legal aspects of the hukou 
that have particularly strong impacts on migrants in China: The provision of medical care
to migrants, the education of migrant children, and the erection of a “points system” that 
determines eligibility for hukou transfer. When seen alongside similar policies and 
struggles over migration in other contexts, it is apparent that the frameworks 
underpinning legal restrictions on internal migration within China are shared by many 
citizenship policies as they regulate international migration. 
In Chapter 4, I return to the question asked in concluding Chapter 2: Where does 
the border that divides urban and rural China lie? While it is possible to point to the 
shifting judicial boundaries of urban areas that determine rural and urban jurisdictions, 
this legalistic approach fails to effectively explain the depth to which the hukou system is 
ingrained in identity formation and understandings of urban (or rural) belonging. In order 
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to locate the border, I inquire as to the grounds on which the hukou system is culturally 
legitimized. In particular, I point to discourses surrounding migrants' suzhi or “quality”, 
as well as the prevalence of local belonging as a primary site of identification. 
Considering these factors in the context of international bordering, I ask what might be 
gained by understanding how borders can become embedded in the mobile bodies of 
migrants themselves. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I bring together the understanding of China's internal 
bordering system that I have developed throughout my thesis, pointing out how this 
analysis serves to both denaturalize and ultimately better explain the structures that 
govern migration in the international context. While deep attachments between 
citizenship, belonging, and the territory of the sovereign state make it easy to see states as
the natural unit of analysis for questions of migration or bordering, the understanding of 
China's hukou system questions the primacy that nation-state borders have held in the 
analysis of border-making and the constraints faced by migrants. 
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Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework
On its surface, the question of where to apply the concept of citizenship is easy to answer.
The figure of the nation-state looms large in common understandings of the concept: To 
consider oneself a citizen is to consider oneself attached to one – or, in some cases, more 
than one – particular nation-state. While it might not be strange to consider oneself as 
“belonging” to a city, town, village, state, province, or subnational region (see 
Zimmerbauer, Suutari, and Saartenoja 2012; Freeman 2003), the legal rights attached to 
citizenship most often manifest through the nation-state, rather than the city itself (Secor 
2003, 149). On the other side of the coin, the existence of or potential for supranational 
citizenship schemes or the potential territorial inclusion of migrants fan nationalist fears 
of cultural erasure, at least in the U.S. context (Spark 2000; Williams and Boyce 2013). 
In this sense, citizenship makes the imagined community of the nation-state real in legal 
terms. These terms, however, are historically contingent and malleable. In the end, the 
question of the institutions to which citizenship is affixed may be difficult to fully answer
through simple, homogenizing narratives of the nation and national citizen. 
One example, drawn from the history of South Africa under aparthied, is 
particularly instructive when it comes to the ways that common understandings of 
national sovereignty (and, consequentially, citizenship as national belonging) “localize 
and depoliticize” our perceptions of poverty (Ferguson 2006, 51). Ferguson juxtaposes 
the history of an attempt by South African politicians to establish what he calls “pseudo-
states” in the Bantustans – so-called “ethnic homelands” that were reserved for “native” 
Black South Africans, with the experience of residents of Lesotho, a state completely 
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enclosed within the territory of South Africa, but nonetheless recognized internationally 
as a sovereign and independent state. The “Republic of Transkei,” which was to be the 
first independent Bantustan,  was given the trappings of official statehood (flags, borders,
a national seal) but was nonetheless never accepted as legitimate by any nation outside of
South Africa. This lack of recognition was in part due to fierce “anti-independence” 
resistance movements that pointed out the political maneuver inherent in apartheid South 
Africa's push to excise Black “homelands” from its national territory. As the Black 
People's Convention declared in 1975, 
“The Independence of Transkei is a cunning manoeuvre by the racist regime of 
Vorster to give National and International credibility to the abhorrent policy of 
apartheid […] The so-called independence is nothing but another manoeuvre to 
“legalize” the alienation of the people of Transkei from the rest of Azania […] so 
as to give the denial of their rights in Azania a legal and constitutional backing 
(Quoted in Ferguson 2006, 59).
It is clear that the scale at which struggles around belonging – around citizenship – play 
out makes a difference. “Independence” for black residents of the proposed Bantustans 
certainly would have come at a price. The discrimination practiced through racist 
apartheid legislation appears abhorrent in part because it is carried out within one nation 
– enacted on a group that is at least nominally recognized as citizens of the same state. As
the declaration of the Black People's Convention makes clear, as soon as that citizenship 
status is altered or lost, it becomes possible to naturalize discrimination – to give national 
and international credibility to the abhorrent policy of apartheid. 
This chapter, which ties theoretical literature on China's internal migration policy 
to developments in international migration scholarship, is written as part of a broader 
push by scholars to de-naturalize the idea that, as non-citizens, migrants may be legally 
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discriminated against. While there is a substantial tradition of highly critical scholarship 
on international bordering processes, much of this work takes the spatialities of 
citizenship and bordering enacted by the nation-state at face value. In turning to China's 
internal migration governance regime, I hope to suggest that despite narratives of 
sovereign control that obfuscate the exercise of discriminatory state violence in policing 
the boundaries of citizenship and territory, the common thread running through processes 
of spatial boundary-making is naked state violence. As Ferguson argues based on the 
attempt to mint the “Republic of Transkei” as an “independent” nation-state,  apartheid – 
or the violent erection of divisions within a citizenry itself – is not as far removed from 
discrimination against noncitizens as it appears at first glance. 
My argument for a theoretical approach to border and migration studies that 
includes Chinese internal migration and the hukou system forms part of a line of thought 
that emerged first in the late 1990s, as part of the rapid profusion of scholarly literature 
focusing on Chinese internal migration at the time. In particular, influential work by 
Kenneth Roberts (1997) and Dorothy Solinger (1999a; 1999b) directly compared the 
limitation of migrant rights through the hukou system to international migration control 
regimes. However, as I will demonstrate, this level of empirical and theoretical attention 
has not been sustained, and despite the existence some more recent work that recognizes 
the function of the hukou system as a bordering process, recent engagements between the 
two fields have not fully brought together the various developments in border and 
migration studies over the past decade and the empirical changes in the hukou system and
the ongoing influx of rural migrants into China's urban centers. 
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 This section first outlines recent developments in border and citizenship 
literatures that I see as facilitating a renewed interest in the discussion of Chinese internal
migration, before addressing the work that has already begun to cross over the two 
subjects. Because current scholarship has largely approached this question along 
disciplinary lines, the remainder of the section is organized according to past scholarly 
approaches to the discussion of citizenship issues in Chinese migration. Following up on 
my discussion of recent developments in border scholarship, I outline the ways in which 
China scholars understand the relationship between internal migration policies and 
international citizenship norms. As I will show, much of this literature takes the metaphor
of internal citizenship as a given, and considers theories of citizenship norms as an 
implicit prerequisites to any understanding of the structure and function of China's hukou 
system. Finally, I discuss how Chinese migration management schemes have been 
represented in scholarship that explicitly ties the hukou system broader conceptions of 
(international) bordering and citizenship, arguing that current engagements by border 
scholars present an incomplete understanding of how China’s migration management 
processes mirror international citizenship policies – a gap in scholarly literature on the 
subject that can be rectified through the application of new theoretical concepts from 
border and migration studies to empirical evidence from the Chinese case. 
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Citizenship and legalized community belonging
The interest to be found in China's hukou system lies primarily in its function as system 
that replicates legal structures of national citizenship at the urban scale. To place the 
hukou system in this context, then, it is necessary to first discuss the concept of 
citizenship itself. In the broadest sense, I understand citizenship as referring to various 
forms of territorialized belonging and attachment in which norms of acceptance and 
belonging are entangled with legal structures.  As Linda Bosniak has argued, while the 
meanings the concept of citizenship can take on are diverse, in most cases it is understood
as an unalloyed positive force (Bosniak 2008, 17). In this framework, citizenship is tied 
to belonging, togetherness, attachment – a confirmation of membership in a community. 
As opposed to this “inward looking” analysis of citizenship, my approach here 
understands citizenship from the other perspective Bosniak suggests, viewing the concept
from the outside and taking particular note of the boundaries it draws. In the act of 
constituting a community, citizenship also marks its edges. This not only freights 
membership with obligations to the community as a whole, but also creates the category 
of the non-citizen, who is by nature excluded from the rights and obligations of 
citizenship (Isin 2002). Standing opposite the citizen is the foreigner, the alien, the other, 
and the criminal. In China, where national citizenship is complemented by structures of 
belonging at the local level, this distinction is mirrored in the opposition between native 
bendi ren  and migrant waidi ren – categories that mark natives and outsiders both 
socially and legally through the connection between the hukou system and the reciept of 
state-funded benefits. Citizenship brings with it the ability to base a claim on one's 
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official belonging, to argue that as a citizen, the state has certain responsibilities to 
individual or collective desires. Thus, with no inherent obligation to the nation-state in 
question, non-citizens are also bereft of rights in many senses – they lack the basis upon 
which to base rights claims within a polity that is not their own. 
Beyond its function as a specific determinant of rights and obligations, however, 
citizenship is also a field of contestation. This includes both contestation at the edges of 
belonging as well as contestation over rights and norms that takes place through 
citizenship itself. For Peter Nyers, “historically, citizenship has been the identity through 
which claims to political being are enacted” (Nyers 2010, 129). Thus, citizenship is both 
a signal of belonging and a means of making political claims. For many migrants who 
arrive without legal status, much less formal citizenship, informal standards of belonging 
are the terrain on which rights claims must first be brought. For example, as Sébastien 
Chauvin and Blanca Garcés Mascareñas have argued, many of the actions of noncitizen 
migrants constitute acts of “probationary citizenship” - actions along a spectrum of legal 
and semi-legal belonging that bring some level of protection with which migrants can 
make claims on their not-quite-adopted states (Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas 2012). 
As Anne McNevin  (2013) argues, this ability to contest belonging has emerged because 
non-citizens have constructed openings within which they can be understood as political 
subjects deserving of rights and protection, putting pressure on legalistic understandings 
of citizenship that position it as tied solely to legal belonging at the national scale.
While I acknowledge the role that migrants have played in contesting national 
citizenship norms from multiple angles and at multiple scales, however, I have chosen to 
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speak primarily to citizenship as a legal construct in this thesis. I have made this 
theoretical move for two reasons. First, from a simply pragmatic perspective, the 
complications of citizenship that scholars have put forth are largely tangential to my core 
argument that China's hukou system functions similarly to systems of national 
citizenship. China's urban citizenship policies have certainly faced contestation, but any 
effective comparative analysis of how identities and legal belongings are contested in 
China and internationally depends on a basic understanding of how the two systems are 
related to each other. Second, while theoretical reframings of citizenship do demonstrate 
that the concept can be understood from a wide variety of perspectives, these theoretical 
rearticulations have not ultimately destabilized the fundamental link between citizenship 
and the nation-state (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008). Thus, I see citizenship 
as a policy that legalizes belonging and determines individual membership in a given 
polity. Citizenship is most commonly understood as being implemented at the national 
level, and almost everyone is understood as a citizen belonging to a country, to the extent 
where the right to a nationality (and in most cases, an associated citizenship) is part of the
UN Declaration of Human Rights. Citizenship is most often acquired at birth, based on 
principles of jus sanguinis and jus soli, which grant citizenship at birth according to 
(blood) heritage or physical presence in sovereign territory, respectively. This status has a
significant impact on individuals' life chances from birth onwards (Shachar 2003). 
Because citizenship is fixed at birth and is very difficult to change, it represents a 
significant barrier to individuals' ability to surmount the vast gulfs of inequality that 
divide nations and their citizens. 
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As a system that explicitly legislates the norms determining individuals' 
belonging in a given urban community,  the hukou system deviates from assumptions 
about belonging at the subnational level in liberal democracies, where enforceable norms 
of legal belonging typically function at the scale of the nation-state. As such, policies that
limit or expand legal belonging at the subnational level in this context generally retain 
this focus on explicitly national citizenship. For example, Arizona's recent expansion of 
state-level controls on undocumented migrants would have no impact on a “migrant” 
moving to the state from Texas (Campbell 2011). On the other side of the coin, there exist
a variety of policies providing formal and informal avenues by which undocumented 
(international) migrants may gain some level of belonging in their adopted communities. 
However, these examples naturally continue to circle around national borders. Monica 
Varsanyi, for example, discusses the provision of identity documents (matrículas 
consulares) to migrant citizens issued by Mexican consulates to undocumented Mexican 
migrants in the United States. These documents have become recognized by several state 
and local jurisdictions as valid identifying documents, a development which Varsanyi 
identifies as a “partial rescaling of membership policy” (2007, 299) that nonetheless 
strengthens the ability of the nation-state to manage the neoliberal contradiction of 
national borders that are open to all commodities but labor. This re-scaling of citizenship 
policy, however, remains centered in and bounded by the scale of the nation-state: The 
recipients of matrículas consulares are identified most strongly in citizenship and 
immigration discourse, (as well as Varsanyi's paper) not by their specific places of origin, 
but as generically “Mexican” citizens. This “localization” of citizenship policy occurs 
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only once the geographic boundaries of the nation-state have been crossed. 
To consider another example, Harald Bauder discusses sanctuary cities – cities in 
the United States and Canada that have either publicly or in a de facto sense refused to 
cooperate with some tenets of national citizenship and immigration policy – as enacting a
type of urban citizenship based on jus domicili, or domicile citizenship, as opposed to the 
traditional citizenship norms of jus sanguinis or jus soli referenced above. In the cases 
Bauder discusses, cities have taken steps to creating their own policies of legal belonging 
that base the rights, obligations, and benefits of citizenship not on blood or birthplace, but
on an individual's current status of “effective residence” in the community (Bauder 2013, 
2). Because the concept of domicile may potentially be understood as subverting national 
citizenship policies (and, thus, applying to citizens of the United States or Canada as well
as to migrants arriving from elsewhere) it does significant work toward the de-centering 
of the nation-state as the primary basis for border control and legal, political belonging. 
Along similar lines, Ranier Bauböck has argued for a return to urban citizenship 
“emancipated from imperatives of national sovereignty and homogeneity may become a 
homebase for cosmopolitan democracy (2003, 157).” In these formulations, however, the 
link between domicile citizenship and urban citizenship is drawn in such a way as to 
suggest that urban citizenship may be an emancipatory alternative to current national 
citizenship policies. While developments in sanctuary cities are no doubt promising, the 
comparison I draw in this thesis demonstrates that urban citizenship policies are by no 
means a simple, unalloyed positive. The structure and function of the hukou system 
demonstrates that the subnational scale of these policies is not directly linked to their 
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liberatory nature. The re-scaling of national citizenship policies with limited alteration of 
their current normative structure does not significantly alter their function. Indeed, hukou 
reform based on domicile citizenship is a project that is similarly compelling when 
compared to issues in international bordering.
Developments in border theory beyond the line
As discussed above, citizenship provides the legal framework for a divide between 
insiders and outsiders. This bordering function of citizenship is operationalized through 
multiple legal structures such as citizenship and naturalization policies, immigration laws,
and the provision of visas to foreign visitors. In the international context,  traditional 
understandings of citizenship are closely tied to policies that implement and secure the 
territorial boundaries of the nation-state (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008; 
Rainer Bauböck 2005). Similarly in discussions of migration, the legal boundaries of 
citizenship are directly connected to the territorial boundaries of the border:  jus soli 
citizenship links legal belonging directly to birth in a certain territory (Shachar 2003), and
many of the rights of citizenship are tied to presence within national territory – to living 
in the right place. For the purposes of the comparison I make in this thesis, territorial 
borders and the legal extremities of citizenship are two inextricably linked components of
systems that legalize and formally spatialize community belonging. The following 
section addresses territorial boundaries, pointing out theoretical developments in 
understandings of borders that facilitate an understanding of the hukou system as an 
urban citizenship policy that effectively borders urban polities. 
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 Pushed by the emergence and subsequent disavowal of globalization-driven, 
postmodern narratives of “disappearing borders”  (Newman and Paasi 1998), scholars 
have pushed theoretical conceptions of borders beyond the classical definition of borders 
as the static boundaries of state territory (Prescott 1987). In the following section, I 
examine some of these developments that have a particular relevance in relation to 
China's hukou system and the prospects for theorizations of bordering processes that 
divide not along international borders, but within the nation-state itself. Specifically, I 
address recent developments in the processual understanding of bordering, the turn 
toward borders as managerial tools for managing migration, and theorizations that 
question the scale at which borders and citizenship are constructed. I then address the 
continued focus on instances of international bordering, paying attention to norms of 
national citizenship and past efforts to consider intranational migration alongside 
movement over international borders. 
The process of reimagining borders beyond classical understandings of national 
territory has required understandings of borders and bordering as processual, fluid, and – 
most importantly – taking place beyond the “lines in the sand” (Parker and Vaughan-
Williams 2009) that divide national territories. These conceptions of borders and 
bordering have led to a profusion of theoretical takes on who makes borders, where they 
are made, how they come together, who is affected, and how those effects are felt 
(Johnson et al. 2011). Spatially, scholars have investigated the ways state power to 
regulate borders extends beyond the territorial boundaries of the nation itself. In the U.S., 
the externalization of border controls coexists with increased enforcement along the line 
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itself, with increased collaboration (under the guise of security) between the U.S. and 
Mexican governments. Directed at stopping or redirecting flows of South and Central 
American migrants, externalization consists not only of an increased border security 
presence along Mexico's southern border, but also internal enforcement that – when 
viewed from the persepctive of Central America – renders Mexico itself a “buffer zone” 
or extension of the U.S. border regime (Menjívar 2014). Elsewhere, scholars examining 
border regimes in Canada and Australia have provided thought-provoking accounts of the
increasing practice of migrant detention on islands as a way to prevent refugees from 
accessing sovereign territory upon which they would be capable of mounting rights 
claims  (Mountz 2011; McNevin 2013). Importantly, this work, along with other 
scholarship that questions the scales at which borders are enacted, discussed below, has 
pointed out the detachment of enforcement practices from boundaries themselves. This is 
an important development not only because it more accurately describes current 
developments in migration and border policy, but also because it provides a versatile set 
of terms that enable the expansion of theorization beyond questions of legal norms 
enforced by the nation-state itself. Through the concept of borderwork (Vaughan-
Williams 2008), it is possible to understand the act of drawing and enforcing territorial 
boundaries as processual – not limited to the static enforcement of immovable 
geopolitical boundaries between nation-states, but fluid, mobile, and often enforced in 
ways that may not make sense in traditional understandings of borders and bordering. 
Meanwhile, scholarship has also recognized that the cultural and material work 
that serves to include or exclude migrants is not always carried out by nation-states as 
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unitary actors. In the United States, the state of Arizona has long established itself as a 
“laboratory” for immigration enforcement activity (Campbell 2011), and cemented its 
position through the passage of particularly harsh state-mandated measures intended to 
incapacitate migrants and facilitate immigration control, including the recent passage of 
the highly controversial SB 1070. As Walker and Leitner argue, this represents one more 
step in a broader trend toward the “devolution” of immigration control authority from the 
national level (through programs such as 287(g) and Secure Communities, which partner 
local law enforcement with federal immigration authorities) as well as “grassroots 
responses to the presence (or potential presence) of undocumented immigrants.” (Walker 
and Leitner 2011) Beyond legal authority entirely, scholars have recognized that various 
civil society actors play important roles in the inclusion or exclusion of migrants – from 
border residents themselves (Williams and Boyce 2013) to faith communities that may 
prove welcoming or exclusive to migrants depending on context (Ehrkamp and Nagel 
2014). While some organizations, such as vigilante “civilian border patrol” groups in the 
United States, view their work as fundamentally serving the interests of the nation-state 
by taking the task of border control into their own hands (Shapira 2013), scholarship on 
this kind of borderwork beyond the confines of national government can be productively 
read as pointing out the fuzzy boundaries between legalized standards of citizenship and 
belonging on one hand, and the norms of acceptance and exclusion that emerge outside 
legal structures. Put together, I read this scholarship as destabilizing the position that the 
nation-state holds as the foundation of the work (legal and otherwise) that goes into the 
construction of community belonging. 
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The character of this work has changed as well. Influenced by the confluence of 
border control and securitization, both of which have intensified since 9/11 (Paasi 2012, 
2303), scholars have begun to describe the organizations that govern and implement 
international borders as implementing managerial strategies that control and direct flows 
of migration, separating desirable migrants from those who are seen as unproductive or 
even as potential threats to security. In particular, this argument has been made with 
reference to agencies that implement transnational migration management practices, such
as the International Organization for Migration and Frontex, the European agency that 
takes charge of various externalizations of border policy  (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010;
Vaughan-Williams 2008). More generally, Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson (2013) 
have argued that management of migration in service to global capitalism is a key 
element of the current international border regime. Of particular interest is their argument
that border policies not only manage which migrants may be admitted to a given territory,
but that there is a significant temporal aspect to this management system: Migrants, as 
laborers, may be admitted or rejected based on the needs of industry at a given time, and 
queue systems facilitate this temporal management of the admission of migrants. One 
additional shift in the work ascribed to bordering processes is the increase of what 
Kanstroom (2007) calls “post-entry social control” – policies that implicitly or explicitly 
regulate the conduct and opportunities permissible to migrants, particularly those without 
legal status in their country of residence. As scholars working on the opportunities and 
legal challenges undocumented migrants encounter within their countries of residence 
have shown, systems of migration control within national borders serve less as tools to 
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preserve the integrity of national borders by excluding migrants wholesale, and more as 
tools to manage opportunities for migrants, constrain their (social and material) mobility, 
and ensure their productivity as a highly exploitable low-wage workforce (Harrison and 
Lloyd 2012; Coleman and Kocher 2011).
The question of where precisely borders can be said to lie has been similarly 
reconfigured. On one hand, researchers have investigated the questions of how the work 
that constructs borders plays out as an element of local politics, both near the border and 
far beyond it (e.g. Gilbert 2009; Madsen 2014; Coleman and Kocher 2011; Walker and 
Leitner 2011). On the other, scholarship has focused on the development of borderwork at
the supernational level, with a particular focus on Europe and the creation of the shared 
Schengen border system (Scott and van Houtum 2009; van Houtum 2010; Andrijasevic 
and Walters 2010; Vaughan-Williams 2008). Despite these developments, as Parker and 
Vaughan-Williams et al note, the study of borders remains marked by its “territorialist 
epistemology” (2009, 583). In suggesting that alternative epistemological approaches to 
the border are necessary, Parker and Vaughan-Williams call for a research agenda that 
might “extrapolate new border concepts, logics, and imaginaries that capture the 
changing perspective on what borders are supposed to be and where they may be 
supposed to lie.” (ibid) This call for research that will provide new ways of knowing the 
border follows clearly from the scholarship outlined above: While scholarship has 
reimagined the spatialities that borders may be said to occupy, the borders that surround 
national territory have remained the primary object of analysis. In the following section, I
will point out work that has already considered alternative understandings of what 
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borders are supposed to be, and begin the work of connecting China's hukou system to 
this work.  
Urban citizenship: Connecting the hukou system to international bordering
In using this thesis to consider the hukou system as ultimately analogous to international 
bordering regimes, I have been in part motivated by the possibilities I see emerging from 
this kind of analysis. In particular, I find the ongoing focus on national territory within 
border studies troubling for two reasons. First, following Linda Bosniak, who points out 
the extent to which citizenship exclusion based on “normative nationalism” is 
unkowingly perpetuated in both popular discourse and scholarship (2008, 135), I wonder 
if the continued focus on nation-state borders as the “proper” axis around which the 
territorialization of belonging revolves may contribute to the naturalization of citizenship 
norms as a legitimate grounds for state discrimination and violence. The potential impact 
of this naturalization is particularly visible in the example of apartheid-era South Africa 
introduced at the beginning of this chapter, which offers a compelling reason to point out 
that while the violence of the borders established under apartheid have been rightly 
decried from all corners, the violence inherent in borderwork carried out by nation states 
has been largely seen as justified by normative understandings of citizenship. Second, by 
focusing the lens of border studies solely on international boundaries, we miss the 
broader picture of how access to space comes to be partitioned for different individuals 
and groups. Following Foucault's shift of focus from the study of government to the study
of governmentality, Anne Laure Amilhat Szary and Frédéric Giraut argue for analysis of 
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“borderities,” or technologies of socio-spatial limits. As they argue, one of the main 
challenges for contemporary border studies is to “name and understand the border 
condition that is everywhere and concerns everybody (Szary and Giraut 2015).” I would 
argue that this task entails tracking not only the movements of nation-state borders as 
they diverge from their supposed territorial locations, but also an understanding the cross-
fertilization of international bordering spatial boundary-making that has nothing to do 
with national territory whatsoever. In my eyes, the hukou system is an excellent point of 
departure for this type of research, because the way it classifies and filters migrants 
within China is so recognizably connected to the systems governing international 
migration. While the hukou system does not depend on the same level of violence as the 
apartheid system in South Africa, it does offer a compelling opportunity to destabilize the
“normative nationalism” present even in much of the critical work in border studies. 
The theoretical inclusion of the hukou system as doing borderwork opens new 
avenues through which to consider the process of bordering itself. Although theorists 
have begun to reconsider the scales at which borders operate, most of this attention has 
been focused on the supernational arena. Up to this point, bordering proper has only been
pertinent to national territories and, through a sort of associative property, agglomerations
of states. As mentioned above, migration within states – and any restrictions placed upon 
it, from apartheid systems to segregation policies to historical practices of urban redlining
– have been considered as an entirely separate phenomena. As noted above, literature on 
citizenship and migration has categorically excluded internal migration from 
consideration (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008). 
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Nevertheless, there are important connections to be drawn between attempts to 
control mobility within state boundaries and processes building borders between states.  
Freedom of movement and residence within the boundaries of a given state are widely 
considered to be fundamental rights, and are enshrined within the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which proclaims that individuals have unqualified freedom of 
movement and residence within the borders of each state (United Nations 1948). 
Meanwhile, the sovereign right of states to safeguard their populations and manage the 
admission and expulsion of non-citizens is a central tenet of international law. Although 
the norms that govern citizenship are no less firmly established, their particulars are 
certainly subject to intense debate, in policy circles as well as academic theorizations. 
The fact that the norms of citizenship that facilitate international bordering lead to the 
perpetuation of vast international inequality, as well as the legal and economic 
exploitation of migrant labor, has led to numerous scholarly calls for the abolition of 
international migration controls as such (Anderson, Sharma, and Wright 2011; Burridge 
2014; Walters 2006; Megoran 2005; Carens 1987). Paralleling this argument, there is a 
significant body of work that draws connections between the system of international 
borders and (illegitimate) controls on mobility within states through the conceptualization
of international borders as a system of global apartheid (Nevins and Aizeki 2008; Sharma
2005; van Houtum 2010). This pointed connection between international and internal 
migration controls functions to draw contradictions between the norms that govern each 
system to the surface. 
That scholars and activists should draw connections between controls on 
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international and internal mobility should hardly be surprising, given the complicated 
history shared by the two systems. In writing the history of the deportation system that is 
so central to current border enforcement policy in the United States, Daniel Kanstroom 
(2007) locates the roots of deportation not solely in international laws of citizenship, but 
also in “various historical forms of exclusion and forced removal, many of which had 
little to do with citizenship law as such.” These policies include the English practice of 
“transportation” or forced removal of convicts, the removal of Native American 
communities as part of ongoing US colonialism, the Fugitive Slave Acts, and 
“colonization” schemes intended to facilitate the deportation of free African Americans to
Africa (Ibid). 
While these examples obviously do not speak directly to the comparison between 
China's hukou system and border politics more generally, they do tell an important story 
of the shared lineage of state power that lies behind state regulations over the freedom of 
movement. Through lingering effects of territorialist epistemology in border studies, 
much of the current literature on borders either naturalizes or reifies the concepts of 
citizenship and sovereign power as they relate to state treatment of non-citizens.  Even as 
scholars direct compelling critiques at systems of bordering, they fail to disturb the 
normative façade that attaches territorialized norms of community belonging (currently 
legalized through citizenship policies) to the naked state power that is brought to bear on 
migrants through systems of exclusion and forced expulsion from national territory. The 
chief value of the global apartheid concept, which effectively scales critique of 
illegitimate state violence up to the international scene, lies in its refusal to accept the 
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norms of state and territory as natural. From a theoretical perspective, the inclusion of 
Chinese internal migration within the framework of bordering follows this same line of 
argument by scaling the frame of reference down: Bordering processes, as elements of a 
global apartheid system, are present at multiple scales. 
Beside theoretical connections between the hukou system's management of 
Chinese internal migration, there are also compelling empirical reasons to draw 
connections between processes of international bordering and the control leveraged over 
Chinese internal migration through the hukou system. While I will explore these 
empirical similarities in depth in a following chapter, it is important to first recognize the 
scholarship that has drawn comparisons between Chinese internal migration and 
international migration. Probably the first scholar to draw a direct comparison between 
Chinese internal migration and international migration processes was Kenneth Roberts, 
whose heavily-cited 1997 article on China's floating population was explicitly positioned 
as an attempt to bring that case into conversation with literature on international 
migration at the time by comparing China's floating population to the population of 
undocumented Mexican migrants within the United States (Roberts 1997, 249). Roberts 
focuses primarily on migrant populations themselves, rather than focusing on the hukou 
system, and offers analysis of numerous similarities between Chinese and Mexican 
migrant populations, particularly their rural origins, the vast gap between China's 
countryside and urban metropoles which mirrors the gap in incomes and wealth that 
exists between the United States and Mexico, and patterns of circular migration that 
Roberts argues were characteristic of both migratory processes at the time. More recently,
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Cindy Fan's definitive review of statistical and qualitative data on China's floating 
population and the hukou system, China On The Move follows up on Roberts' 
comparison, paying particular attention to the connections that migrants maintain to 
farmland in their home villages (Fan 2008, 7). 
Two years later, Dorothy Solinger's 1999 book on the hukou system Contesting 
Citizenship in Urban China explored the hukou system as de-facto policy of “urban 
citizenship,” laying the groundwork for much of the writing on the topic in the following 
decades (Solinger 1999b). In a separate article published the same year, Solinger makes 
her case explicit through a comparison of China's hukou system and the citizenship and 
immigration policies at work in Germany and Japan, which are positioned as nations 
reluctant to accept immigration. As Solinger notes, all three cases present citizenship 
policies based on the principle of jus sanguinis that make citizenship particularly difficult
to obtain for outsiders. Nevertheless, Germany, Japan, and China have all found 
economic success through the recruitment of migrant laborers, most of whom were 
unable to obtain full membership in their adoptive communities (Solinger 1999a). 
While relatively little work coming from the perspective of international 
bordering or theories of citizenship has taken on the question of China's internal 
migration since the early 2000s, the metaphor of internal citizenship is commonly used in
studies of China's floating population. Li Zhang points this connection out most directly, 
arguing that urban and rural citizenship statuses under the hukou system function as part 
of an explicit social asymmetry that  determines access to a diverse package of rights and 
entitlements of (local) citizenship  (Zhang 2002, 312). More recently, Cindy Fan's review 
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of the intersections between the Chinese state, household, and migration similarly refers 
to migrants' lack of access to urban citizenship, noting that the hukou framework as well 
as the rural-urban divide have become widely accepted paradigms for managing 
migration within China (Fan 2008). Developing scholarship also takes the comparison 
between China's internal migration and international migration into consideration, as was 
in evidence at a 2014 Beijing conference on urbanization and migration.  Hosted as a 
collaboration between the Center for Collaboration and Innovation in Social 
Transformation and Governance at Renmin University and the National Health and 
Family Planning Commission's Floating Population Department. One of six paper 
sessions were dedicated specifically to developments in theorization of internal and 
international migration, and juxtaposed discussion of topics such as US skilled migrants 
and racial diversity in Canadian urban neighborhoods with analyses of the causes of 
circular migration patterns for Chinese migrants. In other sessions, such as one focused 
on migrant assimilation, comparisons between international cases and China's internal 
migration were made as a matter of course, and examples were drawn from the context of
Mexican migration in the US as well as other instances of international migration in order
to help explain how migrants are or are not able to integrate themselves into urban 
Chinese society (see National Health and Family Planning Council and Center for 
Collaboration and Innovation in Social Transformation and Governance, 2014)
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Borders, territory, and the hukou system
In comparing the hukou system to processes of international bordering, one significant 
difficulty remains. While I have shown that scholarship on borders and bordering 
processes are increasingly moving away from analysis of international borders as enacted
specifically at the territorial boundary itself, and outlined the deep connections between 
the hukou system and citizenship in the international context, the location of the border 
itself is an obvious question. Frustratingly, it is not easy to point to specific boundaries 
that separate “urban China” from “rural China”, or to locate the specific line along which 
hukou divisions are drawn. In fact, much of the existing scholarship that compares the 
hukou system to international bordering processes sidesteps this difficulty. In particular, 
many studies point directly or indirectly to Aihwa Ong's treatment of migrant labor in 
China's Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Neoliberalism as Exception, in which Ong 
points to the boundaries of SEZs as the primary border faced by migrants (Ong 2006, 
104-110). Mezzadra and Nielson, for example, recognize the impact of the hukou system 
as a legal border with important consequences for Chinese migrant workers, but focus 
primarily on the application of the system within the Shenzhen and Shanghai SEZs 
(Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). Similarly, Anne McNevin (2013, 54) points to the floating 
population as a potential mirror for the circumstances of irregular migrants worldwide, 
but limits her argument to migrant workers in SEZs. 
While the implementation of SEZs has undoubtedly had important effects on the 
development of export industry in China and the recruitment of migrant labor from rural 
areas, the impacts of the hukou system are much broader, and impact migrants in urban 
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areas across China. Arguing along similar lines, Luigi Tomba cites the patterns of 
residential segregation that characterize migrant and local neighborhoods in urban China 
to question Ong's focus on governmental zoning technologies:
Since these practices of segregation characterize large parts of the urban territory, 
however, I interpret them not simply as exceptions to existing patterns of 
sovereignty but, rather, as a technology to classify individuals and groups, 
resulting in different practices of government being applied to different people 
(more or less autonomous, more or less reliable, more or less self-disciplined). 
(Tomba 2009, 598-599) 
Ultimately, the focus on SEZs identified is strikingly influenced by the territorialist 
epistemology identified by Parker and Vaughan-Williams (2009) that I have discussed 
above. In theorizing the bordering of internal migration, SEZs  – specifically delimited 
areas that exist under different economic and legal structures and surrounding territory – 
seem at first glance to be a functional object of analysis. Indeed, Shenzhen, which is 
perhaps the most iconic site of Chinese factory production (and a major draw for 
migrants, with about 80 percent of its population lacking local hukou) is constituted as an 
SEZ. Further, as Ong rightly points out, SEZ boundaries do demonstrate a new kind of 
bounded economic space with its own connections to migrant labor and legislated 
belonging.  However, to focus on SEZs and neglect the exclusion of migrants throughout 
China as a whole is misleading, and misrepresents the legal structure of urban belonging 
in China by ignoring the fact that rural migrants in urban areas across the country are 
excluded from the rights and opportunities available to “permanent” urban residents 
through their hukou status as “temporary” residents who retain a legal attachment to their 
place of origin. 
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In fact, the administrative divisions that mark the boundaries of urban areas – and 
even SEZs themselves – are hard to pin down. As Carolyn Cartier has recently argued, 
Western scholars have barely begun to study China's administrative divisions on their 
own terms, instead “subsuming them under internationally recognizable epistemologies 
such as urban and regional planning (Cartier 2015, 7).” In China, the administrative 
divisions that designate territory as rural or urban, belonging to this town or that urban 
area, are permanently open to re-definition by the central government. This process is 
relatively opaque, and can lead to the overnight redefinition and re-zoning of large areas, 
and can lead to the subsumption of rural areas and smaller cities alike into the 
administrative space of larger cities. The example that Cartier gives is particularly 
instructive both in pointing out the issues present in an uncomplicated focus on SEZs, 
and in pointing out the flexibility of the territorial boundaries defining urban China. In 
2013, it was announced that Shanghai – specifically, the Pudong New Area, which was 
itself formed in 1990 as a special trade zone and financial center – would be the site of 
the new China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone. However, this new zone is not really 
“new” at all – in fact, it is made up of a non-contiguous collection of specially designated
territories that have been variously repurposed over the past few decades. Of particular 
interest is the subsumption of the port city of Nanhui into the jurisdiction of Shanghai in 
April, 2009 in order to provide deep-water shipping access for the new Free Trade Zone 
(Cartier 2015). While this example is particularly impactful and involved the dissolution 
of an entire city government, the re-drawing of boundaries is relatively common, and 
wholesale urban district mergers is becoming more so, with 15 urban areas having been 
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absorbed by other jurisdictions in the period from 2008 to 2013 (ibid, 12). The effect of 
these mergers and territorial changes on hukou status varies widely, and can lead to re-
registration in newly created districts, but most often maintains the status quo in terms of 
social exclusion, either through the limited provision of services to certain intra-urban 
districts, and often does not alter the “rural” hukou category of new “urban” residents 
(Kam Wing Chan, personal communication, 2015). 
 To further complicate the already-difficult task of locating the shifting borders 
that divide rural migrants from urban residents, administrative divisions themselves are 
no more visible in China than they are anywhere else. In comparison to the increasing 
enforcement of many international borders around the world, the boundaries divide 
Shanghai, Beijing, and Shenzhen from surrounding jurisdictions are permeable and 
largely invisible. While the deep divide between rural poverty and urban wealth is of 
course easy to see, stark divides like the one that marks the U.S. - Mexico border between
El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua are nowhere to be seen. Nonetheless, 
implementations of the hukou system continue to facilitate an effective legal divide 
between locals and outsiders that places spatial limits of belonging and restricts migrants' 
abilities to enjoy the rights of (urban) citizenship that are available to locals. 
As I have demonstrated, there is a need for theorizations of the hukou system that 
place it in conversation with international bordering literature. While previous 
scholarship – particularly Dorothy Solinger's work in in the 1990s and Li Zhang's 2002 
article on the hukou as urban citizenship policy – have highlighted citizenship as a clear 
entry point for the inclusion of the hukou system and China's floating population as topics
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for analysis within studies of bordering and citizenship, recent work on borders and 
migration have not convincingly followed up on this avenue with work that integrates 
recent advancements in border theory alongside empirical work that takes the hukou 
system seriously as a boundary-defining legal system. This remains true despite 
significant advances in scholarly understandings of borders and migration, as well as the 
reconfigurations of both the hukou system and systems of international boundary-making.
As I have shown, scholarship on borders has begun to accept increasingly fluid 
conceptions of what borders are, where they are enacted, and which agents bring them 
into being. At the same time, the legal boundaries that mark China's migrant population 
as nonmembers of the urban polities in which they reside have not remained static, and 
have shifted significantly since the wave of Chinese migration scholarship that erupted in
the mid to late 1990s. It is time for scholars to revisit the connections between hukou and 
citizenship – to bring new understandings of both concepts to bear on one another, and to 
take the results of these comparisons seriously. The remainder of my thesis, drawn from 
empirical research on migrant and local conceptions of the hukou system in Shanghai, 
serves as a preliminary example of this type of analysis, providing a set of comparisons 
that demonstrate the viability of comparative analyses linking the hukou system and the 
enforcement of migration restrictions across international borders. 
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Chapter 3: The Hukou System and Urban Citizenship
This chapter considers China's hukou system as a citizenship policy enacted at the urban 
scale. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, a significant scholarly tradition has already 
established the strength of this analogy – in particular, work by Li Zhang (2002) and 
Dorothy Solinger (1999a; 1999b) have used the concept of citizenship to great effect in 
understanding the legal difficulties faced by rural migrants in urban China. However, as I 
have argued, the full import of an understanding of citizenship that does not find its roots 
in nation-state borders has not been fully realized by theorists of the border or of 
citizenship itself. In an attempt to point out what can be gained through the analysis of 
China's hukou system through the lens of international bordering (and vice-versa), this 
chapter considers a series of empirical examples arising from China's urban migration 
and hukou policy alongside theoretical and empirical perspectives on international 
bordering. 
While previous chapters examined the history and context of the hukou system 
and developments in theories of international bordering and citizenship, here I use 
specific examples and empirical perspectives to point out some of the many overlaps 
present between the hukou system and international bordering regimes. I discuss the 
structure and function of the hukou system as a legal organ for the exclusion of migrants, 
beginning with the function of the hukou in facilitating the legal division between 
“insiders” and “outsiders”, which is discursively tied to a narrative of limited (state) 
resources and the exclusion of noncitizens from various state services. In particular, I 
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focus on the provision of medical services and state-reimbursed medical care, as well as 
the exclusion of the children of temporary migrants from the compulsory education 
system in Shanghai. Following these discussions of the ways migrants are excluded from 
legal belonging in urban areas, I point to the systems in place for legally transferring 
one's hukou status part of a broader system of differential inclusion, in which migrant 
inclusion is flexible, contingent, and partial. 
The hukou system and the boundaries of (urban) citizenship: Bordering as legal 
exclusion
As described in the previous chapter, my understanding of citizenship follows Linda 
Bosniak (2008) in approaching the concept from its edges and boundary conditions. By 
understanding the conditions under which citizenship functions exclusively – whether it 
is enacted at the urban or nation-state level – it is possible to think about the work 
citizenship does. In the case of China's hukou system, as well as many other citizenship 
policies worldwide, rights and access to the state are an important benefit of citizenship. 
One of the primary exclusionary functions of the temporary residence permit system for 
Chinese internal migrants is the limitation of access to government-funded social 
benefits. Under the same decentralization reforms mentioned above, China's urban 
governments provide a wide variety of benefits and services to residents, in some ways 
carrying forward the legacy of state-led resource provision beyond the Communist era. 
Although these benefits are a far cry from the full state control over resources that ended 
in the late 1970s, state-provided benefits include various forms of medical insurance, 
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unemployment insurance, and state-funded pensions, as well as compulsory education 
(Zhao and Zhang 1999). 
The majority of these benefits accrue only to individuals registered with local 
hukou. Just as is the case in many immigrant-receiving countries worldwide, holders of 
temporary residence permits in urban China are legally prevented from accessing the 
majority of the state services guaranteed to official residents, as they have passed outside 
the territorial jurisdiction of the body charged with guaranteeing their rights of 
citizenship.  Although the situation differs somewhat depending on the urban jurisdiction 
in question, it is fair to say that in most cases, the only benefits that accrue to migrants are
those that they pay into in order to receive. In Shanghai, migrants are eligible for 
voluntary pension withholding programs, but not eligible for any services funded by state
money or through employer contributions (Zhang, unpublished manuscript). In my 
interviews, Shanghai locals and migrants alike recognized this as one of the most 
important functions of the hukou system, making the point that without the system, 
migrants would flood into Shanghai, absorbing resources, driving prices up, and out-
competing locals for jobs. As was repeated by young Shanghai financial workers and 
demographic researchers alike during my interviews, the hukou system serves “as a way 
to maintain social stability.” Harkening back to the conception of migration as mangliu, 
or blind flow, the inaccessibility of local hukou to the floating populations functions as a 
filtering technology that is seen as both necessary and natural by official Shanghai 
residents and migrants alike. As was discussed in Chapter 1, previous incarnations of this 
system were remarkably successful in cutting off migration entirely. Now, in the era of 
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mass migration, the hukou system functions less as a valve, and more as a system to 
manage flows of migration through differential inclusion. By allowing migrants access to
livelihoods in urban areas through temporary residence permits, it is possible for urban 
areas to recruit a vast low-wage labor force, absent the assumption that local government 
should ever take full responsibility for their welfare. As temporary residents, migrants are
prevented from accessing state services in their place of residence and remain tied to their
home villages, unable to obtain full membership in the urban polities where many have 
resided for long periods of time. 
Healthcare and Citizenship
Healthcare is one of the most important services currently reserved for local hukou 
holders. While migrants do have access to basic outpatient care services, funding for 
specialized services and any inpatient care is restricted to holders of local hukou. Due to 
the way local jurisdictions are understood as connected to hukou status, migrants do 
retain access to medical care in their home villages when they move, but these services 
are often far away and difficult to access. This difficulty of access is compounded by the 
fact that the quality of rural medical care is often far below the standard of care that can 
be found in urban areas. The regulation of access to medical care is an important feature 
of the hukou system in part because it vastly reduces the population for whom local 
governments are responsible. In urban areas such as Shanghai, where nine million 
migrants make up nearly 40% of the population (Shanghai Statistical Bureau 2011), the 
potential cost of expanding local healthcare services to migrants is astronomical. For 
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local residents and managers alike, the question of who is deserving of state-financed 
medical care is often answered by pointing first to the degradation of service quality (for 
locals) that would take place if rural migrants were offered state-funded medical care. 
The lack of access to care for migrants can have devastating impacts on migrants' 
lives. Xiaohua, one of my interview participants, discussed the difficulties she found in 
accessing medical care at length. Her daughter had been diagnosed with leukemia as a 
young child, and had passed away less than a year before I interviewed her mother. 
Xiaohua was haunted by her inability to do more for her daughter's care. The costs of the 
necessary treatments were very high, and without state-provided medical 
reimbursements, were much more than she could afford on the piece-work salary she 
received as a janitorial employee at a Shanghai university. While her family moved into a
cheaper apartment in order to better afford her daughter's medical bills, Xiaohua worried 
that the poor ventilation and damp conditions of their new apartment may have triggered 
her daughter's remission. Despite her best efforts, and a significant sum of money raised 
by students and faculty at the university, she was unable to pay the various medical fees 
necessary for her daughter's treatment. Nevertheless, while members of the university 
community came together to support Xiaohua, her inability to access state benefits that 
would have helped provide treatment for her daughter was a reflection of the explicit 
function of the hukou system's division of government benefits between “temporary” and 
“official” residents.  
The complex relationships between belonging, deservingness, and law that are 
invoked in Xiaohua's dilemma are strikingly similar to those present in debates over the 
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provision of resources to international migrants. Similar questions revolving around the 
provision of health care for migrants have been hot-button political issues in the United 
States since the 1970s,  when public and state fears of immigrant “freeloading” on 
welfare benefits have resulted in policies that prevent non-citizens from accessing 
federally-funded welfare resources, including many health services (Marrow 2012, 847). 
In other contexts, similar anxieties about state provision of services to “outsiders” have 
led to a variety of policies that explicitly attempt to prevent non-citizens from accessing 
publicly funded health care services through various tactics.  This was the case with the 
1994 passage of Proposition 187, California law requiring health care workers to refer 
potentially undocumented migrants to immigration services. Although this restriction was
unique to California at the time, comparative analysis with undocumented migrant 
communities outside of the state demonstrated a pervasive fear among migrants that they 
might be unable to access needed services (Berk and Schur 2001).  
 In China and in the U.S., the results of limited access to care are often similar, as 
is made clear in Helen Marrow's (2012) investigation of a San Francisco healthcare 
initiative Healthy San Francisco (HSF) which makes explicit efforts provide healthcare to
undocumented migrants. In contrast to the requirements of Proposition 187, San 
Francisco has prohibited the collection of information on legal status by a variety of state 
and peri-state officials, and providing “universal access” to primary care services for all 
individuals (including undocumented migrants) not covered under other federal or state 
health insurance programs. However, even in this relatively open environment there are 
numerous barriers to full healthcare provision for migrants. Despite attempts to open the 
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system to patients who may not have official identifications or proof of residence, service
providers who themselves want to offer care to undocumented migrants still encounter 
documentation barriers that function to exclude some irregular migrants. Beyond the 
documentation barrier, services are also substantially limited by the fact that 
undocumented patients receiving coverage through HSF are ineligible for referrals for a 
variety of specialty care services, and also cannot be linked to other ancillary welfare 
services (Marrow 2012, 852).
The result of the exclusion of undocumented migrants discussed by Willen and 
Marrow mirrors Xiaohua's experience of a medical system that is functionally unable to 
provide care to certain residents due to their legal status. Bordering processes do not 
always succeed in spatially separating migrants from medical care, but they do 
reconfigure the real possibilities of migrants' access to care. While Shanghai's medical 
system is one of the best in China, Xiaohua's daughter – by virtue of her status as a 
temporary resident, legally attached to her home community rather than her actual 
residence – was excluded from access to treatment. It is important to note that this legal 
distinction was made despite the mobilization of (officially resident) community 
members, who raised money to pay the medical bills that Xiaohua was unable to meet. 
Jesica Santillan, a migrant organ transplant recipient whose experience Leo Chavez 
(2008) discusses as a prime example of the difficult intersection of citizenship and 
medical care, was put in a similar position: While opponents of migration viewed her 
surgery as emblematic of “wasteful” medical expenses on non-members of the (legal) US
polity, local residents also contributed to a fund for her medical care (ibid, 129). Legal 
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constructs of citizenship, working at national and subnational scales, function to delimit 
the boundaries of deservingness in the eyes of the state. While migrants perform vital 
labor in both contexts, the benefits of citizenship are reserved for those with the privilege 
to have been born into the fold, or the social and economic resources necessary to modify
their status. 
As Willen (2012) argues, the pragmatic question of who has access to healthcare 
often overlooks the underlying question of “deservingness” – that is, the question of who 
really ought to have access to health care and who ultimately should not. In approaching 
the issue through analysis of migrants' access to healthcare, it becomes apparent that at 
least part of the question of deservingness is explicitly territorial and geographical. While
I am concerned primarily with legal issues here, it is important to note that the legal 
question of who should have access to health care is inextricably linked to deeper issues 
of community belonging and membership that reach beyond the legal sphere and take 
root in social and cultural norms that define the edges of community for those within it 
and those who will never be able to access full membership. The complex relationship 
between social belonging and citizenship will be explored in depth in the following 
chapter; it is enough at this point to simply argue that citizenship and the provision of 
health care are deeply entangled in the context of international migration, and that the 
difficulties that confront attempts to provide care to undocumented migrants in the United
States are at least partially mirrored in Xiaohua's contradictory experience of local 
support and simultaneous legal exclusion. Since internal migrants in urban China are 
nominally national citizens, they are consequentially understood as deserving of some 
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state protection, which does include healthcare. However, the limits of this protection are 
territorialized through the hukou system: While migrants ought to be able to receive care, 
the sensible place for them to do so is in their hometowns – their place of permanent 
residence – not in the cities where their residence is understood as merely temporary.
Education and Citizenship
Much like the healthcare system, China's education system is also segregated on the basis
of hukou status. This division is particularly grating given the emphasis placed on 
education throughout China's long history. This tradition underlies the country's current 
education system, in which livelihood pathways are often determined by students' success
or failure in the all-important gaokao college entrance examination. Because the gaokao 
is the primary determinant of secondary educational opportunities available to 
individuals, it has a significant impact on the life chances of everyone who takes it, or 
fails to do so.  Rather than being standardized nationwide, however, the gaokao is 
administered by local and regional governments across China. Thus the test itself – and, 
accordingly, test preparation curricula – differ between various local areas, and test-takers
may only test in the jurisdiction where their hukou is registered. Thus, like many other 
institutions in China, the gaokao and the provision of educational services are tied 
directly to hukou status.  
The reality of the hukou system's effect on children's lives and education was 
brought home for me in an interview I conducted with Mrs. Zhang, a middle-aged 
migrant woman from a rural village in Sichuan province. When we spoke at a table in 
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front of her successful noodle shop, she was taking a brief break in the lull after the lunch
hour. As she told me, she has been happily living in Shanghai for five years, and did not 
seem fazed by any difficulties involving the hukou system in her own life. While she does
have to regularly renew her registration as a temporary resident, she reported that the 
process for her is streamlined, and that overall she is willing to deal with a small amount 
of bureaucracy in exchange for the substantial increase in income she has seen since 
coming to Shanghai and opening her shop. Nevertheless, her home life has been deeply 
marked by the manifestation of hukou categorization in China's education system. For the
period she has lived in Shanghai, Mrs. Zhang's daughter remains in her home village in 
Sichuan, where she attends elementary school. As a result, Mrs. Zhang is only able to see 
her daughter a few times a year. When I asked her if she had ever considered bringing her
to Shanghai to live, Mrs Zhang replied that she had never entertained the thought, 
primarily because when the time comes for her children to take the zhongkao (a test 
determining high school admission) or gaokao, they would have to leave Shanghai to do 
so, and the education systems and curricula are significantly different. Thus, for the sake 
of her children's education, they were left behind. 
The plight of such “left-behind children” has become widely acknowledged in 
China, with a wide variety of journalistic and academic interventions pointing to the 
difficulties parents face when they are unable to bring their children with them as 
migrants (Ding and Bao 2014).  This phenomenon has a huge impact across China as a 
whole: Over 60 million children have at least one migrant parent. This represents 21% of 
China's population under the age of 18 who are growing up outside of traditional family 
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structures. In part due to difficulties accessing educational services in destination 
communities, this population is nearly double the number of children who followed their 
parents' migration to urban areas, which accounts for another 35 million children, or 
approximately 13% of Chinese youth. All told, the lives of over a third of China's 
population under the age of 18 have been directly impacted by internal migration (Hu, 
Lu, and Huang 2014, 1). In migrant villages like Taoyangcun, so many working-age 
people have migrated that the remaining population is made up largely of the children 
and grandparents of the migrant generation. 
Although the ways that migration affects individual families vary significantly 
depending on circumstances, they invariably disrupt the traditional structure of family life
in China, in which the work of raising children is shared not only between two parents, 
but also with substantial assistance from grandparents, particularly on the paternal side. 
For left-behind children, the result of migration may be to be raised by a single parent (of 
either sex), or to be raised entirely by grandparents.  For parents who bring their children 
with them, the trek to the city can mean separation due to long working hours, as well as 
a disconnection from extended family. Beyond family issues, the social divide that adult 
migrants face in urban areas is exacerbated for migrant children (Goodburn 2009). 
Investigating the quantifiable impacts of migration on both migrant children and those 
left behind by at least one parent, child psychologists have identified a significant link 
between migration and negative impacts children's psychological and behavioral 
development, with children left behind in migrant sending communities faring slightly 
worse on most measures than migrant children, and significantly worse than local 
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children in both sending and receiving communities (Hu, Lu, and Huang 2014). 
The inclusion of migrant children in the (compulsory) urban education system is 
one of the primary sites of tension around the hukou system. In the face of calls by the 
central government for improved education of migrant youth, the localization of the 
gaokao may be the most enduring element of the educational segregation that China's 
migrant population has faced, but it is probably not the most severe. While conditions are
changing rapidly and vary in different urban jurisdictions, the status quo is still very 
much one in which migrant children lack access to the same educational opportunities 
that are readily available – or, rather, legally compulsory – for official urban residents. 
Prior to reforms in 1996, public education was simply unavailable to migrant students in 
Chinese metropolises. As recently as 2009, a study of the education of migrants in 
Beijing demonstrated that the educational system remains largely segregated (Goodburn 
2009). While migrants are now legally allowed to enroll in public schools, their ability to 
do so in most urban areas is limited by the number of available seats. In Beijing, space 
for local residents is guaranteed, and migrants are only allowed to enroll in schools that 
have “extra” space available.  
As a result, the majority of migrant children in Beijing attend special “migrant” 
schools operating as part of the informal economy. While the central government has 
issued a variety of edicts that promote the education of migrant youth by local 
governments, it is likely that these instructions have not been widely followed. Indeed, 
efforts by the central government to promote public education for migrants may have 
harmed migrant education in real terms, because the same document that urged local 
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governments to take up the task of educating migrants also suggested that children should
only be educated in state schools, and led in some cases to the forced closures of informal
schools that were some migrants' only option for education (Goodburn 2009, 496). Even 
when migrants have formal access to schools, they are often excluded through other 
measures – for example, local governments can implement substantial fees to enroll 
children who lack local hukou, with the result that for-profit informal education is often 
actually less expensive than public education for migrant families.
There are severe limits to the education offered to migrants through the existing 
system. As has been convincingly demonstrated through a study of educational 
achievement that includes migrant children, a non-migrant cohort from the same home 
village, and local children in Beijing, migrant students' educational potential (which is 
often relatively high, given the self-selection bias of migration) is often wasted as they 
attend for-profit migrant schools, many of which have scant resources to offer, and 
provide sub-standard instruction that in many cases was actually inferior to the quality of 
education offered in rural public schools (Lai et al. 2014). After taking these factors into 
account, the gaokao continues to loom over the heads of all students, and migrants in 
particular. In Shanghai, where substantial reforms have resulted in the absorption of 
between 10 and 40% of the migrant student population into public schools (Goodburn 
2009, 496), Helen Gao (2014) identifies a steady year-by-year decrease in the population 
of migrant students at each age cohort. While migrants make up nearly half of the 
population at age 1, less than one quarter of the population at age 14 lacks local hukou. 
From age 16 to 18, however, this gap closes rapidly, and half of the cohort of 18-year-old 
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Shanghai residents is made up of migrants lacking local hukou. Gao argues that this 
demographic shift – involving over 50,000 migrant youth in Shanghai alone – is likely 
caused by an educational strategy in which students return to their home villages by the 
age of fifteen, where they attend high school and prepare for the gaokao, since they 
would be unable to access tailored curriculum in Shanghai or other migration destinations .
For rural parents considering a move to urban areas, the structure of the hukou 
system creates a series of difficult decisions about education and parenting, with no 
simple solution. For Mrs. Zhang, leaving her children at home in Sichuan made the most 
sense, allowing her to focus entirely on running her business while her husband's parents 
raised her daughter. For other parents – those with less ability to rely on family at home 
to raise children, for example – it makes sense to bring children along to urban areas, 
despite the difficulty of accessing public education and the potentially substandard 
quality of unofficial migrant schools. 
While the motivation of this segregation of the educational system are likely 
similar to those discussed above with relation to healthcare provisions, the segregated 
education of migrant youth is remarkable in that it is one area in which China's hukou 
system is in fact more restrictive than many international migration policies. The 
exclusion of migrant children under this policy appears particularly egregious from the 
perspective of the United States. While there have been significant battles over the 
provision of postsecondary education for migrants in the United States, largely centered 
around residence policies and tuition (see Gonzales 2008) all noncitizens – including 
undocumented residents – have been guaranteed equal access to state-funded primary 
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education under the Supreme Court ruling on Plyler v. Doe in 1982. Based on the equal 
protection clause of the 14th Amendment, this ruling explicitly separated education from 
other social welfare programs, and located the basis for the provision of education to all 
US residents (regardless of status) on the importance that education holds for the 
functioning of the U.S. democracy. 
This continued stress on education as a centrally important function of the state is 
similar to the position the Chinese central government has taken on the education of 
internal migrants, at least on paper, since the 1980s, when the Central Committee of the 
CCP issued a decree promoting a focus on raising the “quality” (suzhi) of the Chinese 
people as a central tenet of education reform (Goodburn 2009). The politics of suzhi 
quality discourse will be discussed in depth in the following chapter – for now, it is 
simply worth noting that inclusive education reform is a widely accepted goal, and that 
local governments have largely failed to comply with the central government's repeated 
urging to provide adequate education to migrant children. Given the high costs of 
education and the understanding that migrants are nothing more than temporary residents 
and laborers, this logic makes a certain amount of sense.  In the United States, the 
obligation of state governments to provide education services to undocumented migrants 
has been repeatedly challenged, with various attempts at the federal level to pass 
legislation invalidating the Plyler v. Doe decision. State-level lawmakers have also 
written their own challenges to these obligations, including California's Proposition 187, 
mentioned above in the context of healthcare restrictions (Lopez and Tsitouras 2007). 
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Flexible Inclusion and Points Systems
The process of reimagining borders beyond classical understandings of national territory 
has required understandings of borders/bordering as processual, fluid, and – most 
importantly – taking place beyond the “lines in the sand” (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 
2009) that divide national territories. Scholars have begun to describe borders less as hard
lines that seal off national territories, and more as managerial tools that direct flows of 
migration. The character of China's hukou system as it stands today fits very well within 
this rubric for understanding new developments in border policy. Reconfigurations of 
border control in the post-9/11 context have also led to the development of various 
“flexible” schemes in North America that make borders more porous, albeit only to 
certain privileged classes of travelers who are able to exempt themselves from many of 
the inconveniences, difficulties, and outright blockages that emerge through the 
securitization of borders (Sparke 2006). Meanwhile, as Gregory Feldman (2011) argues 
in his analysis of the European border regime under the Shengen agreement, the 
confluence of neo-nationalist sentiment (which rejects any steps toward providing 
citizenship for migrants) and neoliberal economic programs (which appreciate the value 
of flexible, mobile labor forces) has created a discourse in which migration management 
agencies champion a flexible regime of migration management that attempts to 
“regularize, encourage, and direct circular migration” in order to meet Europe's economic
needs, while ensuring that migrants return to their countries of origin (ibid. 2011, 158–
159). 
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While migrants may be disqualified for official membership, spatial boundaries 
are porous and serve to manage and regulate movement, as opposed to stopping it 
completely. Taken together, policies of boundary-making for some and freer movement 
for others constitute parts of a regime of flexible inclusion under which “the boundaries 
between the dynamics of filtering, subordination, and labor market discrimination that 
once occurred at the international border and those that take place within the bounded 
spaces of national societies have been blurred” (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013, 159).  
Migrant-receiving societies cannot afford to fully exclude migrants: someone must build 
the skyscrapers, man the factory lines, and staff the kitchens. The hukou system and 
floating population are particularly demonstrative of the ways in which the flexible 
inclusion of migrants helps manage and control a reliable workforce. 
The importance of the hukou system as a system of flexible inclusion and labor 
market control is particularly visible through interviews I carried out with Ping 
Chenguang, a retired civil servant who was a member of Shanghai's population statistics 
bureau throughout the period of mass migration into Shanghai. She points out that 
migrants have formed the base of Shanghai's economy since the industrial reforms 1980s:
[After the reforms] Shanghai’s societal and economic development went through 
a big transition - that is, the construction of buildings in the city was very fast. 
And the construction teams were all migrants. For example, Shanghai’s great 
bridge, the Yangpu Daqiao, the Huangpu Daqiao,  as well as other bridges and 
tunnels a great number of skyscrapers - the great majority were built by migrant 
work teams.
Nevertheless, understanding and regulating this population is a critical goal for urban 
governments, as Ping pointed out in defense of the continued existence of the hukou 
system: 
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If you were to ask me, I think the hukou system is still necessary. […] Because 
Shanghai… it’s not a renewable resource, it really is just one piece of land. If 
everyone was to come here, there would be problems! There still needs to be 
some kind of a threshold for admission. I think the hukou system is still necessary 
because if it wasn’t there and everyone migrated, it would cause huge problems. 
From governmental management to resources, there could be problems across all 
sectors. I reckon the hukou system won’t be opened up in a short time, but will 
continue to function.
While the hukou does not create the same acute precarity as that faced by many 
international migrants, it operates on a similar register. While migrant contributions to 
Shanghai's spectacular development are recognized, migrants themselves are not fully 
welcomed into urban polities, for fear that they would overwhelm the services (such as 
health and education) provided to local hukou holders. In the end, China's the neoliberal 
forms of urbanization that are remaking Chinese cities (He and Wu 2009; F. Wu 2008) 
owe much to the existence of the floating population, and to the policy of flexible 
inclusion through the hukou system and the system of temporary residence permits. 
While the lack of a fixed boundary intended to limit or prevent migrants' movement into 
China's urban areas does make internal mobility within the country arguably more free 
than movement across most international borders, the policies limiting migrants' potential
for legal inclusion in urban areas constitute a border in themselves. 
This regime of flexible, partial, and temporary inclusion is reminiscent of other 
policies of flexible inclusion in the context of international migration. For example, the 
Bracero program, which allowed US employers to recruit Mexican temporary workers 
from 1942 to 1964, was initially implemented in order to counter the labor shortage that 
arose when the United States entered World War II. The migrants who were admitted by 
the program were granted legal status, and encountered a relatively permeable 
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international boundary. However, visa status for Braceros  offered them no path to 
citizenship or permanent legal membership in the United States. Instead, Braceros were 
“cast and treated [...] as a cheap, disposable, foreign, exploitable, and temporary 
commodity (M. M. Ngai 2004).” This combination of legal status, labor exploitation, and 
lack of access to the rights of citizenship is strikingly similar to the experience of many 
Chinese migrant workers, who form the backbone of the labor force that has driven China
to record growth, while remaining legally segregated from the urban Chinese population 
that holds local hukou. 
For migrants who are potentially included by the hukou system, very different 
factors come into play. Methods of securing urban hukou have existed throughout the 
duration of the system's implementation. Besides official job transfer and related forms of
(centrally) “planned migration” (Fan 2008), cities have offered a “blue stamp” program 
that permitted migrants to purchase legal residence permits that – in much the same sense
as programs of legal permanent residence in the United States – could be convertible to 
full local residence status following a definite period of good conduct (Chan and Zhang 
1999, 839). However, “blue stamp” hukou was deprecated in the early 2000s, and has 
since been replaced by new entry-condition based systems (Wang 2004). Shanghai has 
played a leading role among Chinese cities in the development of new hukou policy, and 
implemented China's first points system for hukou eligibility in 2004, which was 
designed specifically to attract talented migrants. A similar policy, which purports to be 
more open to hukou transfers by migrant workers, was adopted in Guangdong province in
2011. Under the Shanghai points system, would-be migrants are scored on various 
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categories, including business credentials, academic credentials, and the qualifications of 
the candidate's employer. If a candidate meets the requirements, they then become 
eligible to apply immediately for Shanghai hukou.  
Even for highly qualified applicants, this process places a high bar – a student I 
worked with at Fudan University had recently been granted her PhD and obtained a 
teaching position in another Shanghai university, but nevertheless was worried about her 
chances obtaining Shanghai hukou. Her educational achievements and recently-obtained 
employment were top-notch, but she was concerned by the possibility that she would not 
meet the requirements of the points system. The inability to obtain local residency would 
severely complicate her position: While she had secured high-status (if not high-paying) 
employment, lack of local hukou would still exclude her from many of the state-provided 
benefits of urban life discussed above. Many students who travel to attend universities are
also technically included in the floating population, as their hukou status remains tied to 
their home communities. However, this status is considered an element of “planned” 
migration, and is considered in a different light to economic migration. Non-local 
students at universities in Shanghai are considered a class apart from “migrants” by local 
government and communities even if their origins lie in rural communities. After having 
secured admission to local universities through the gaokao, students join a class of 
upwardly mobile, educated, and “desirable” residents. However, upon graduation, 
students lose their association with the university and its associated status, unless they are
able to convert their newly developed social capital in ways that are recognizable by the 
hukou points system.
72
The mechanics of this process are similar to migration and citizenship policies in 
several advanced economies. The points system implemented in Shanghai functions in 
direct parallel to similar systems for the recruitment of skilled migrants in the 
international context, where nations such as Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, and 
Australia use systems of points to categorize the human capital migrants bring with them 
when they enter the country (Papademetriou and Sumption 2011). “Blue Stamp” hukou 
transfers formerly conferred a probationary status that provided most of the benefits of 
full hukou transfer, and facilitated the eventual conversion into full membership. The 
resulting status permitted long-term legal residence and granted significant rights to 
migrants while withholding the status of full membership in the community.  The 
function of this program is similar to visa programs that permit the “purchase” of long-
term visa status through investment visas, a common practice worldwide, with US E-2 
and EB-5 investment visas being a preferred method for wealthy migrants to obtain status
in the United States, as well as “business class” migration categories in Canada (Galabuzi
2006, 163). At the same time, a variety of other preferential programs targeted at 
entrepreneurs and other elites make it clear that many of the restrictions imposed by 
bordering regimes do not apply to individuals of a certain status (Sparke 2006). In China 
as well as internationally, the boundaries that demarcate spatial belonging are applied 
unevenly, and function not to prevent movement altogether, but to filter and direct it, 
including migrants who are read as desirable and excluding others who are positioned as 
not belonging  (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Cacho 
2012). 
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Citizenship and bordering
As this chapter has demonstrated, China's hukou system functions as an urban citizenship
policy that creates a legal divide between rural migrants and official urban residents that 
has real impacts on millions of migrants' lives. While divides between newcomers and 
foreigners are common in other contexts of internal migration, the explicit legal 
categorizations present throughout China are unique in that they replicate many of the 
legal divides that are created in international citizenship policy. These legal divides are a 
crucial element of the modern process of bordering, and an understanding of citizenship 
that neglects to account for the borders that the concept draws loses much of its 
conceptual depth. While the examples I have provided in this chapter are only some of 
the possible angles along which the hukou system might be productively compared to 
processes of international bordering, they do illustrate some central truths about the 
structures borders can take, as well as the functions for which bordering processes can be 
employed. The hukou system has changed much since the earlier incarnations in which it 
was employed as a strikingly effective means of deterring all migration outside of that 
planned by China's central government. Under the current system, migration is not only 
an open possibility – in fact, it forms the basis of China's urban economy. Nonetheless, 
this lack of a hard boundary preventing or discouraging migration does not imply the lack
of a border. The citizenship divides implied by the hukou system are disconnected from 
the fixed enforcement of jurisdictional boundaries, but are nonetheless decidedly spatial. 
This spatial division is apparent not only in the readily apparent difference between the 
fortunes and opportunities available in rural and urban China, but also in the pervasive 
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construction of rural migrants as “outsiders” and the legal limitation of their access to 
rights and services on the basis of this categorization. 
Having developed an understanding of the hukou system as producing a legal 
border with regard to citizenship rights in urban China, however, several questions 
remain. Understanding that legal and cultural labels and divisions are largely co-
constitutive, the focus on legal aspects of the hukou system in this chapter only tells part 
of the story of how migrants come to be understood as outsiders. In particular, the 
question of how the hukou system becomes justifiable in the absence of the norms of 
national sovereignty that are commonly used to justify international bordering. In the 
next chapter, I will explore the hukou system and the construction of migrant subjectivity 
in China beyond the law itself, a discussion that has deep implications for the question, 
raised in Chapter 2, of the location of the border that the hukou draws between migrants 
and locals, or rural and urban people. 
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Chapter 4: Suzhi Quality Discourse and Embodied Borders
Despite the legal exclusions explored in the previous chapter, all but one of the migrants I
spoke to downplayed the impacts the hukou system has had on their lives. While it is 
impossible to know if criticisms of the hukou system were silenced by fear of reprisal or 
of speaking poorly of China's system of government to a foreigner, criticisms of the 
hukou system were surprisingly rare in my interviews. Of my 26 interviewees, only two 
expressed any structural critique of the hukou system.  Xiaohua, the migrant woman 
whose story of insufficient medical care I discussed in the previous chapter, largely 
blamed her situation on the hukou system. Guo Tai, a professor in the School of Social 
Development whose research focuses on demographic shifts related to China's aging 
population, based his position against the hukou on references to Western countries' lack 
of internal migration control, and argued that ultimately, the labor market has stabilized 
internal population movements in most countries that do not regulate such migration. 
That these were the only two substantial critiques of the hukou system I 
encountered while carrying out interviews was surprising.  A conversation I had with Li 
Li, a domestic worker who I spoke to in her hometown, Taoyangcun, offers one way to 
understand the general acceptance of the system.  When I asked Li Li if she had would 
apply for Shanghai hukou if given the chance, she replied that she wouldn't, and that 
many of her compatriots would not either. As she said, 
“Right now, having a village hukou is pretty good. You have a field to 
plant. The people who can get urban hukou don't want to, because those 
of us who hold rural hukou have land, and aren't willing to give up the 
status. Non-agricultural [urban] hukou is basically no good.” 
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While rural hukou excludes migrants from many services in urban areas, it also is the 
legal mechanism through which rural families maintain control of the land that still 
provides a significant portion of their livelihood. Roberts (1997) as well as Fan (2008) 
argue that one explanation for migrants' continued connection to their places of origin lies
in the fact that Chinese internal migrants' trajectories are often circular, constantly 
returning to hometowns where they themselves (or their families) maintain land that – 
while not enough to sustain the whole family – serves as a fallback and important 
resource. This land may be worked by family members or contracted out to other local 
families, but proves to be a material anchor for migrants' sense of local belonging. 
The fact that expulsions of migrants are rare and mostly historical may also have 
had something to do with my interviewees' lack of concern for the impact the hukou 
system might have on their lives. While there have been notable historic instances in 
which migrants have been forcefully removed from urban areas, there has been no real 
threat to migrants' continued physical presence in urban areas since 1995, when state 
authorities demolished Zhejiangcun, an informal settlement in Beijing. While this 
destruction of housing displaced 40,000 migrants, the largest community of its kind in the
city, the goal of the destruction was not to expel migrants themselves – rather, it was to 
break up an emerging migrant power structure that was seen as a threat to state 
hegemony. (Zhang 2001; Liu and Liang 1997). However, the destruction of Zhejiangcun 
was an isolated event, and has not been replicated. In Shanghai, none of the migrants I 
spoke to were particularly worried about being sent back to their home communities. 
In this sense, the hukou system diverges significantly from the pervasive use of 
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deportation as a form of social control exerted on migrants in the context of international 
migration (Kanstroom 2007). It is likely that this divergence has important effects on 
migrants' understanding of citizenship and belonging in urban areas. In the international 
context, Patricia Ehrkamp and Helga Leitner, for example, find that many migrants have 
an understandable desire to maintain ties to their places of origin, even as they seek 
membership in their adopted communities. However, one of the primary rationales cited 
for needing full membership in adopted communities in the first place was the perception 
of secure livelihoods that citizenship brings: Citizens cannot be deported, and citizenship 
is seen as a way to secure long-term residence in the face of nativist politics and potential
expulsion (Leitner and Ehrkamp 2006, 1622). In China, the issuance of temporary 
residence permits serves to effectively legalize and flexibly include labor migrants in 
urban areas. The pressures exerted by the ever-present threat of deportation in the 
international context (Harrison and Lloyd 2012) are conspicuously absent. Without the 
potential for deportation, the disinclusion of migrants from government benefits is likely 
easier for migrants themselves to rationalize.
Still, these differences between the hukou system and international border regimes
do not explain how local or regional belonging is understood and felt by Chinese 
migrants, or how exactly the exclusion of migrants from local hukou is rationalized and 
justified. While migration control at international borders is largely naturalized through 
conceptions of sovereign nation-state territory as discussed in Chapter 2, freedom of 
movement within national borders is understood in the Western context as a basic human 
right. On the surface, at least, it is expected in most cases that cultural differences, 
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regional differentiation, or other divides within the national body are subsumed into the 
common legal framework and imagined community of the nation-state (Benedict 
Anderson 2006; Weber 1976).This subsumption of difference under the common rubric 
of nation-state citizenship is certainly at work in China. While the history of ethnic 
division in China is too extensive to explore in depth in this thesis, postsocialist China 
has been undergoing a revitalization of ethnic tradition that includes the recognition of 
subgroups within the Han nationality as well as the increasing recognition of a wide 
variety of minority ethnic groups (Gladney 2004).  Ethnic difference as such no doubt 
plays an important role in the construction of “outsider” status for many Chinese 
migrants, it was rarely mentioned or discussed in my interviews. Muslim Hui migrant 
acquaintances with whom I did not record interviews did discuss how ethnic differences 
affected their positions with regard to Shanghai people, but spoke of ethnic difference 
and hukou as separate issues. Within my recorded interviews, regional identity and 
belonging were much more commonly referenced, and carry their own weight. Therefore,
my discussion here focuses on the construction of “locals” and “outsiders” as a function 
of regional belonging, rather than ethnic or racial difference.  
This is somewhat of a difficult position to take, in particular because from my 
own vantage point, it is hard to imagine a regime of intra-national bordering without 
drawing parallels to South African apartheid or the history of Jim Crow segregation in the
United States – policies that have become synonymous with racialized oppression, which 
have since been delegitimized through protracted struggle. It is in part because of the 
legacy of this struggle, the drawing of enforceable borders within nation-states is difficult
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to justify. In discussing the hukou system as closely related to regimes of international 
bordering, I do not intend to suggest that it bears no relationship to these more-racialized 
internal bordering systems such as South African apartheid or the history of Jim Crow 
segregation in the United States – policies that have become synonymous with racialized 
oppression.. Rather, I hope to join other scholars in destabilizing the commonly employed
grounds used to rationalize international bordering. While it is easy to decry apartheid 
systems, most people find it easy to justify the enforcement of state boundaries. 
Delimited territorially through borders and legally through citizenship, the purported 
unity of the nation-state goes a long way toward providing a rationale for the kind of us-
and-them divides that are facilitated through nation-state bordering processes: Normative 
notions of territorial sovereignty and the legalistic models of citizenship that attach to 
them provide a more-or-less clear map of the lines between “us” and “them.”
As has been demonstrated in Chapter 3, the hukou bears important similarities to 
international bordering regimes. Nonetheless, the political structure it is based on – post-
socialist rule by a party-state (Cartier 2015) that is decentralized but decidedly not 
federalist – cannot be effectively compared to the system of international norms that 
define citizenship and national bordering. How, then is the hukou system understood as 
justified within China? Beyond the fact that only two of my interviewees offered real 
critiques of the system, it was evident in many of the discussions I had about my research
with friends, interviewees, or curious strangers that it is hard to comprehend a world 
without internal migration controls from within China. In fact, many of the people I 
spoke with were surprised to hear that the United States has no similar system. Absent the
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norms that legitimate international bordering, what are the common understandings that 
make the hukou system so palatable to the people whose lives it effects? 
This question cannot be answered by looking to the law alone. Operating from the
assumption that legal and cultural norms are co-constituted and deeply entangled, this 
chapter briefly explores the depth of place-based identities in China, as well as the 
concept of suzhi, or “quality,” as sites from which legitimizing discourses may arise. 
Based on the construction of rural migrants as an Other that cannot fully assimilate into 
urban Chinese life, I finally return to the question posed at the end of Chapter 2: If the 
border that divides rural and urban China is not directly tied to enforcement of the 
shifting jurisdictional boundaries of urban territory, where can we locate the bordering 
process? I suggest, based in part on theories developed in the field of (international) 
border studies, that the borders that many Chinese migrants encounter are not mere legal 
implements, but are in fact embodied and enforced beyond the reach of the law itself. 
Identity and local belonging
Local identities are a crucial aspect of identity formation for my interviewees.  One 
migrant worker I spoke to, Lao Jin, had first come to Shanghai from Anhui province in 
September 1979. As he remembers it, he arrived just after the food markets made such a 
journey possible. After working for over a decade as a roadside grain peddler, he had 
worked various jobs before arriving at his current position, delivering drinking water for 
a local subsidiary of the multinational giant Nestle. When we spoke, he had lived in 
Shanghai for over twenty years. In the past, he routinely returned to Anhui to work his 
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land, but more recently he has remained in Shanghai full time. Despite his long tenure as 
a Shanghai resident when I asked him about the fairness of divisions between rural and 
urban areas, his first response was to try to help me understand that the question I was 
asking was based on a false premise: It would be impossible for him to consider himself 
as a Shanghai person, he argued, pointing out my own identity as an American before 
equating it to his own incontrovertible identity as an Anhui person “Even if you come 
here, you are still American. [In the same way] I just think, I am an Anhui person.” Even 
after twenty years of life in Shanghai, this privileging of local identity functions to 
naturalize the hukou system by legitimating the perpetuation of differences between 
“locals” and “outsiders”.
The stress on local identity has been widely referenced by many other scholars 
working on Chinese internal migration. In a manner similar to the forging of transnational
ties between local sending communities and their counterparts in instances of 
transnational circular migration such as that between the US and Mexico (Massey, 
Durand, and Malone 2002, 20), co-villagers from the same regions and rural villages 
across China retain close ties once they arrive in destination communities.  As Li Zhang 
notes in her ethnography of migrants from Wenzhou, Zhejiang province in Beijing, 
networks based on shared native place are important driving factors that first brought a 
significant concentration of migrants to Beijing. These ties have endured and become 
strengthened, and at this point migrants' social positions depend heavily on their places of
origin: 
Zhejiang migrants dominate garment, leather, and eyeglass businesses; Xinjiang 
migrants run restaurants […] Henan migrants sell vegetables and reycle trash; 
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Hebei migrants work in construction; Anhui migrant women work as maids; and 
Shandong migrants work as tricycle peddlers. Migrants from different regions see 
each other not only as economic competitors but also as social and cultural 
outsiders. (Zhang 2001, 31)
Beyond the various entrepreneurial sectors in which migrants are divided by their places 
of origin, local and regional identities also create important political and economic 
divisions in the context of factory labor. In her ethnography of Guangdong factory 
workers, Pun Ngai points out that the culturally and spatially loaded question “where are 
you from?” was the most common greeting between strangers. In the factory where Ngai 
did her research, local and regional identities attained stereotypical status for managers 
and workers alike. For managers, workers' regional identities were understood as being 
linked to various qualities and “defects,” including loyalty or rebelliousness, laziness or 
the ability to work hard for long hours, clumsiness or precision, and ambition or a lack 
thereof (Ngai 2005, 121-123). 
These qualities were understood as being imparted by the places where migrants 
were born and grew up. In general, the ability to perform the kind of precise, “modern” 
labor necessary to manufacture electronic equipment was understood by (urban-
identified) line managers as antithetical to the supposedly sloppy, imprecise, and low-
quality “pre-modern” rural labor that workers were accustomed to prior to migrating. 
More specifically, work not only informed hiring decisions and staffing choices, but also 
formed the primary dividing lines for conflict and competition between workers 
themselves. Native-place identity was the foundation upon which many close 
relationships and affiliations between workers were built, and local affiliations became a 
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means of developing (factional) workplace power, with smaller groups of workers, such 
as those originating in northern provinces, being relegated to undesirable positions (ibid). 
This pervasive emphasis on locality and local belonging functions alongside 
national identities. When Lao Jin refers to himself as an “Anhui person”, he does not 
disavow his Chinese identity. In fact, by pointing out my own status as a national Other – 
an American in China – he placed his status as an Anhui person in Shanghai in a category
of regional belonging that parallels attachment to the nation-state. Unlike the complicated
politics of ethnic solidarity and regional self-determination demonstrated in Uyghur and 
Tibetan resistance to full assimilation within the Chinese state (Yeh 2009; E. V. W. Davis 
2008), this kind of regional belonging does not necessarily pose a threat to national unity.
Rather than being oriented against the imagined community of China as a whole, Lao 
Jin's association as an Anhui person functions as a supplement to national belonging. In a 
sense, this kind of parallel belonging can be understood as functioning in the legal realm 
as well. For Guo (Guo 2014), the hukou system, legal regulation of ethnic identities, and 
national citizenship all function as parallel citizenship regimes. Each has different effects 
on the lives and livelihoods of the individuals it effects, but all can be meaningfully 
understood as legal organs of Chinese citizenship. Along the same lines, regional 
belonging can be productively understood as one subregister of Chinese belonging, with 
deep roots and important consequences for the millions of migrants who often find 
themselves physically present but socially and culturally excluded in China's urban 
metropoles. 
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Quality and discrimination in suzhi discourse
The regional identities and attachments described above are by no means understood as 
equally valuable. Beyond the stereotypes that employers and migrants themselves apply 
to certain regional identities, rural migrants are widely considered to be deficient when 
compared to urban residents. One primary axis for this hierarchical division is the 
concept of suzhi. Loosely translatable as “quality,” suzhi has no direct English translation.
Suzhi is deeply tied to conceptions of modernity and “civilized” comportment, and the 
“quality” it implies is personal and embodied. This embodied condition can be innate 
and/or learned, and encompasses a variety of “physical, psychological, intellectual, 
moral, and ideological qualities of human bodies and their conduct (Jacka 2009, 524).” 
Suzhi came into common usage in the 1980s, when it was used to discuss the 
quality of China's population as a whole in a push by the central government to 
emphasize the need to improve the “quality” of the Chinese population as a development 
goal, with “undeveloped” rural populations being seen as a particular target for the 
improvement (tigao) of suzhi  (Anagnost 2004). This focus was reflected in the emphasis 
placed on suzhi as a goal of education reform, declaring that the goal of the education 
system ought to be to improve the suzhi of the whole population (Goodburn 2009). Since 
the beginning, suzhi has not been understood as being equally distributed. Rather, China's
rural population has been repeatedly constructed as being particularly suzhi deficient, 
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although there are significant differences (as in the regional stereotypes mentioned above)
in how suzhi is stereotypically connected to place throughout rural and urban China (Sun 
2009). Suzhi may even be seen in operation in the mildly competitive discourse that pits 
“modern”, “entrepreneurial” Shanghai against “traditional” (but more politically central) 
Beijing. 
It is the divide between rural peasants and an urban middle class, however, that 
appears to be the most deeply ingrained. Ann Anganost cites an interaction from her 
research into the educational practices of middle-class parents, whose efforts are largely 
focused on improving the suzhi of their children, to demonstrate the ways suzhi is 
understood in very different ways between the middle class and the class of migrant 
workers:
One of my interviewees, […] an urban professional fully invested in managing 
the educational career of his child, testily interrupted me to say that the use of the 
term suzhi in evaluating the embodied value of both child and migrant referred to 
“two entirely different kinds of suzhi.” For him, suzhi represented a differential, a 
play between plenitude and lack that could not be set into relation with each other.
(Anagnost 2004, 190)
Suzhi represents something different when it refers to migrants and the urban middle class
– for the former, suzhi is commonly understood as that which migrants lack, at least until 
it is developed through a process of education, acculturation, and the assimilation of 
urban, middle-class values. 
When I discussed urban prejudices against rural migrants with a group of young 
Shanghainese finance workers, the language of suzhi was audible throughout the 
discussion. As one interviewee, Wang, stated about relationships between rural migrants 
and the urban middle class, 
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“Sometimes, we have conflicts because of cultural reasons. And 
sometimes we have... These people, I think are partly good and partly not 
that good. Because you know, some of them come from the country. They 
are not, you know, polite, they’re not educated. So, we don't have a lot of 
common language with them.” 
Education and having the right kind of manners are deeply connected to suzhi, and seen 
as essential for effectively assimilating into the urban way of life. For Wang, some 
migrants can develop suzhi, while others cannot: 
[Migrant] workers, they are not well educated because they’re aging, not that 
young. Like 30’s or 40’s. They come here, and this is one kind of category. 
Another category is their children. They come to the big city to study. Then, when
they graduate, they have this kind of knowledge and they can do white collar 
[work]. But their parents come here to do the blue collar [work]. I think the 
objectives, the purpose for them coming is different. For the workers and the, ahh,
not well educated or less educated people, they just come for money. And for the 
others who graduated or study in Shanghai or the big cities, they stay - what they 
search and plan for is the quality life. 
Migrants who have passed the age where they might acquire suzhi are seen as 
permanently deficient – at odds with urban ways of life, and even causing conflicts. The 
characterization of migrants' goals is important as well: For the children of migrants, as 
well as rural students whose gaokao scores have earned them entry into Shanghai 
universities, the quality of urban life is a draw that leads them to search and plan for ways
to stay. Older migrants, whose ways of life are less flexible are characterized here as not 
even desiring a truly urban lifestyle. At least in the understanding of many urban 
residents, the migration of older rural workers is merely temporary, a way to earn money 
that would be unavailable in rural areas. Thus, suzhi links perceptions of class, status, and
worth to spatial belonging (Sun 2009). 
Suzhi has material impacts on those it categorizes. The residential segregation 
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pointed out by Luigi Tomba (2009) and cited in Chapter 2 is based not on legal zoning or 
coding, but on suzhi-based classification that divides urban middle and upper classes, 
rural migrants, and the local class of workers formerly employed in now-shuttered state-
owned enterprises. Beyond housing, suzhi also affects workers' ability to get jobs, as well
as the kind of work they are considered eligible to apply for. In cases where work can be 
understood as aspirational (as opposed to dead-end manual labor in construction or 
transportation), management often employs discipline and harsh labor to “educate” 
migrant workers in the skills necessary to perform as urban workers. Pun Ngai catalogues
a wide variety of such disciplinary moments in her ethnography of Guangdong factory 
workers, pointing out in particular one example in which a production line leader 
reprimanded a newly arrived worker for scratching the casing of an electronic device, 
saying “You know you're not plowing a furrow, don't you?” and deriding her rural, 
peasant-like qualities of “rough hands” and “rough feet” (Ngai 2005, 115-116). As 
Wanning Sun argues, the continued employment of suzhi discourse to disparage migrant 
workers' poor performance in certain aspects of their work further facilitates place-based 
discrimination and drives down wages. As she finds in the case of the Shanghai nanny 
(baomu) industry, which is heavily staffed by rural migrant women, non-migrant nannies 
are able to command much higher wages, to the extent that origin-place of domestic 
workers becomes a class distinction in itself: Local nannies, who are perceived as being 
of markedly higher quality than migrants, are hired almost exclusively by the upper 
echelons of Shanghai society – white-collar workers in foreign companies. Middle-class 
workers with less disposable income are often unable to pay the wages a local woman 
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would charge, and hire migrants despite worries that their low-suzhi habits might affect 
their child's development, and that migrants – by their very nature as members of the 
“floating” mobile population – are less trustworthy (Sun 2009 629-630). 
As a discourse employed to categorize rural migrants, the politics of suzhi are 
closely linked to citizenship and the hukou system. For Sun, suzhi and the hukou system 
are essentially co-constitutive, with the kind of place-branding that suzhi entails having 
its roots in the initial establishment of the hukou. At the same time, while hukou 
restrictions have been loosened and mobility is now a possibility for many rural residents,
suzhi discourse has arisen to fulfill the subsequent need for “exclusion and boundary 
keeping at a symbolic level (Sun 2009, 622).” Thus, suzhi can be seen as one of the 
primary discursive tools that not only legitimizes the ongoing segregation of migrants in 
urban areas, but also contributes materially to their segregation outside of the legal 
framework itself. 
Theorizing borders through suzhi: The embodiment of not-belonging
The embodied nature of suzhi is a particularly interesting element of suzhi discourse, 
because it provides an alternative way of answering the question posed in Chapter 2, 
where I began to question the location of the border dividing rural and urban China. 
Because of their fluid nature and lack of enforcement, it is difficult to understand the 
jurisdictional boundaries that divide rural and urban areas in China as boundaries in the 
same way that we theorize the more-or-less “hard” militarized territorial boundaries of 
nation-states. Nonetheless, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, the hukou system creates 
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citizenship categories that in many ways function analogously the kinds of bounded 
citizenship that exist in the international context. While I have argued that the hukou 
system demonstrates that bordering processes need not be understood as being solely 
rooted in the boundaries of nation-state territory, this perspective does not fully explain 
how boundaries can come to be enacted on individual migrants. Based on the ways suzhi  
has come to signify and reinforce the legal boundaries of urban citizenship imposed by 
China's hukou system, I suggest that one way to look for the roots and effects of 
bordering processes beyond territorial divides themselves might be to think of borders as 
embodied – as carried in the bodies of migrants themselves, and in the ways migrant 
bodies are coded and read from the vantage point of migrant-receiving communities.  
This analysis is highly indebted to Wanning Sun's reading of the overlap between 
the hukou system and migrants' supposed suzhi deficiencies. While she does not consider 
the embodiment of suzhi that she points out as a theory of bordering per se, the 
connections are readily apparent in her analysis, which I quote here at length: 
Suzhi discourse operates at the corporeal level, not just because in theoretical 
terms it allows the value of one body to be transferred to the other, but more 
tangibly because it is embedded in an entire array of bodily practices including 
the following: what bodily smells, touch, and physical bearings are (un)acceptable
in daily interaction; whose bodies are seen to be in need of being regulated, 
managed, and sanitized; and whose rules of bodily contact are dominating. The 
body functions as a way of regulating class-based difference, anxiety, and desire, 
allowing the urban middle class to claim superiority to its rural, peasant, or 
working-class other. Unbeknownst to rural migrants, when they leave the village, 
enter the city, and walk into urban residents’ home as baomu, their place of origin 
has already been abstracted into a signifier of rurality and low suzhi which, 
against their wishes, is reinscribed onto their mobile body. (Sun 2009, 624)
If the legal borders drawn by the hukou system are justified and made legible through 
conceptions of migrants' (deficient) suzhi, then these borders are carried in migrants' very
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bodies, and made visible through coding of behavior, style, language, and embodied 
characteristics as being attached to and belonging in certain places and not others. 
More directed research would be required to fully explore the ways suzhi 
contributes to a kind of embodied bordering, but in a preliminary way, it is not difficult to
draw connections with the ways international border regimes are tied to certain embodied
traits. In France, the embodied evidence of torture or other bodily trauma is increasingly 
being used to sort “legitimate” asylum seekers, who must be granted legal status, from 
those who cannot substantiate their narratives of abuse or torture and are often 
subsequently rejected as mere economic migrants, who can be safely excluded through 
the law (Fassin and D’halluin 2005). In this case, the body becomes a site where specific 
signifiers alter the legal status of a mobile individual, verifying that their claims to 
legitimacy are genuine and that the rules governing the provision of asylum do in fact 
apply to them. Those whose bodies do not demonstrate this embodied worthiness are 
rendered vulnerable to expulsion and deportation. 
In a different context, Lisa Marie Cacho points to the characteristics that make 
certain lives valuable, and argues that the perpetual criminalization and  
disenfranchisement of (predominantly Black) felons and undocumented migrants springs 
from a common experience of social death – a racialized process by which communities 
are symbolically excised from the national body and deprived of rights. This process is 
both embodied and spatial: “The bodies and localities of poor, criminalized people of 
color are signifiers for those who are ineligible for personhood, for those contemporary 
(il)legal statuses within U.S. law that are legally illegible (Cacho 2012, 6).” That the 
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embodied boundaries faced by undocumented migrants in the United States are deeply 
racially coded is a feature of the history of racialized exclusion in this country (see 
Kanstroom 2007). While suzhi discourse and the hukou system operate in a very different
historical context, the embodied qualities of difference that they enforce on rural Chinese 
citizens in their home communities and in urban areas are at least reminiscent of the ways
bordering processes manifest through the coding of embodied characteristics as negating 
claims to rights and official status in other contexts. 
While it is unfortunately beyond the scope of my research and this thesis to build 
a definitive analysis of embodied nature of hukou status and suzhi, the analysis that I have
presented offers a tantalizing if preliminary way to think about bordering processes 
beyond their traditional normative foundations in the sovereign territory of the nation-
state. While structure of the hukou system is strikingly similar to that of many national 
citizenship regimes, it is the differences and difficulties this comparison implies – the 
lack of a hard boundary dividing rural and urban areas in particular – that ultimately lead 
me to think of borders as embodied. There is further work to be done on this issue, both 
in China and elsewhere. To do so, however, will require the development of an 
understanding of border enforcement that goes beyond justification of bordering through 
notions of sovereign territory. Like Cacho's work, such analyses of borders and bordering
will have to be aware of the ways that national borders function in parallel to other 
racialized imaginaries that justify the excision of spaces and people from the bounds of 
full legal belonging. At the same time, such an analysis should be conscious of the ways 
borders are created and enforced apart from the territorial boundaries of the nation-state. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
In this thesis, I have explored the potential of a perspective that brings theories of 
(international) boundary-making to bear on the unique politics of China's hukou system. 
This comparison seems somewhat odd at first glance. After all, international boundaries 
hold a special place in our understanding of mobility.  As a United States citizen, I am 
accustomed to unfettered mobility within national boundaries. My own family has made 
great use of this ability to move freely: My mother and father only met because my 
mother, who grew up in a rust-belt town in Ohio, moved West as a recent college 
graduate, restless and looking for new surroundings. After my parents married in 
Colorado, they moved frequently, following new opportunities – from Colorado to 
Arizona to Washington (my birthplace), back to Arizona, then to California and finally 
landing in South Dakota. Personally, I have taken a more eastward trajectory, leaving 
rural South Dakota for the Twin Cities in Minnesota before moving to Wisconsin and, for
now, to Kentucky.  The ability to move freely within national borders is seen as a 
foundational right, to the extent that it is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. At the same time, mobility across international borders is understood as 
rightly constrained by the sovereign right of nation-states to regulate and determine 
which foreigners may or may not enter their territory, for what reasons, and for how long.
This sovereign right to control international mobility is often seen as the 
foundation that legitimizes state control of migration across international borders. As 
such, it features heavily in popular discourse about migration and border control, as well 
as scholarly discussions of international boundary-making. By discussing the hukou 
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system in the same register as international bordering, I have argued that it is important to
to complicate these common understandings of how movement can be constrained, and 
how these constraints are legitimized. In China, as I and many others have shown, the 
dichotomy between free movement within national borders and limited mobility across 
them is nonexistent. Instead, internal migration is subject to regulations that make it 
difficult to officially change residence, require migrants to register as temporary residents
of urban areas, and deprive all such “temporary” residents of most of the benefits offered 
to full urban residents. Thus, the hukou household registration system functions as a 
parallel register through which citizenship and belonging are understood in China (Guo 
2014). While millions of migrants have traveled from rural to urban areas, and make up 
significant percentages of the population of some of China's largest cities, the vast 
majority of these migrants are legally understood as making up a “floating” population 
that is given little to no opportunity to become full, legally registered members of the 
urban polity. The hukou system spatializes internal belonging, drawing a legal divide 
between “rural” and “urban” population categories, as well as attaching households and 
individuals to specific jurisdictions. As such, I have argued that it constitutes a bordering 
system that enforces the boundaries of citizenship in urban China.  
To understand the hukou system in this way troubles assumptions about 
international bordering in two ways. First, because the hukou system functions without 
the benefit of widely accepted norms of sovereign territory and national citizenship, the 
fact that it shares significant functionality with international bordering processes invites 
the question of whether norms of sovereign territory do in fact lie at the basis of border 
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control policies, or whether shared logics of border control may be considered instead as 
artifacts of political expediency and the illegitimate exercise of state violence. After all, 
the specters of words like apartheid and segregation – now synonymous with racialized 
control over access to space – are easily raised by discussions borders existing internal to 
nation-states. The violence of migrant detention, deportation, and border control, 
however, continues to be widely understood as justified. Part of my hope in juxtaposing 
international bordering and the hukou system, then, is to bolster critiques of international 
bordering that have already attempted to connect international and internal border-
making through the phrase “global apartheid” (van Houtum 2010; Nevins and Aizeki 
2008; Sharma 2005). By calling attention to the fact that borders are drawn apart from the
sovereign right of the nation-state, I demonstrate the potential for analyses of the kinds of
bordering that exist apart from and alongside nation-state boundaries. 
In locating China's hukou system as an example of a “non-traditional” border, my 
thesis also demonstrates one of the possible responses to the various recent calls for new 
border epistemologies (Szary and Giraut 2015; Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2009). In 
particular, the fact that the hukou system differentiates status without drawing fixed 
territorial lines offers a novel perspective on the broader trend in border studies toward 
the examination of border enforcement that takes place far from the boundary line itself, 
when immigration enforcement becomes internalized and takes place deep within 
national territory (Gilbert 2009; Coleman 2007) or is externalized and spreads beyond the
confines of national territory (Menjívar 2014; Mountz 2011). In order to understand how 
the hukou system delineates boundaries without drawing hard and fast territorial lines, I 
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have turned to an analysis of the ways that the embodied characteristics of otherness – 
present in Chinese rural migrants as a supposed lack of suzhi, or “quality” – ultimately 
perform a bordering function in themselves. In this sense, I have suggested that the 
border that divides rural migrants from urban residents in China may be carried with 
migrants as they cross into the symbolic field of urban China. 
These conclusions have considerable implications for future research in borders 
and migration studies generally, as well as for studies of Chinese internal migration. The 
possibility of separating the tight link between citizenship, border-making and the 
territory of the nation-state, in particular, creates questions about the ways that theories of
international bordering might be applied to consider the internal boundaries that exist 
within states outside of China. Some of this work has already been done, including 
attempts to consider the prison-industrial complex and border-making projects alongside 
one another (Loyd, Mitchelson, and Burridge 2013) as well as work on the intersections 
of race, citizenship, migration, and criminal law (Dilts 2014; Cacho 2012). Citizenship 
and rights in the United States and other liberal democracies are not homogenous, and 
rights and opportunities differ substantially from place to place. Beyond China, the 
insights drawn from scholarship on borders and citizenship should be applied to the 
myriad ways that legal and social categorizations become actualized as borders within the
territory of nation-states themselves. 
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